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INTRODUCTION
The patent grant is a social contract.1 Society defers for a
limited time the right to make, use, or sell2 an invention that
is useful, novel, and nonobvious.3 In exchange, the applicant
provides a disclosure that teaches one of ordinary skill in the
art how best to make and use that invention.4 As a result,
society trades a period of exclusivity for a defined contribution to its body of useful knowledge.5 As more commonly
1. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) (stating that a
patent is a public bargain of exclusive use in return for disclosure”); see also Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1276 n.166 (1995) (“Patent law has been described as a social contract in which
the interests of all parties must be balanced.”); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New
Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 511 n.195 (1985) (“It is common to see copyright and
patent law described as a kind of social contract or bargain.”); Jeff Kuehnle, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: Opening the Floodgates on Nonliteral Patent Infringement Through the Doctrine of Equivalents, 48 BAYLOR L. REV.
589, 604 (1996) (“Patent law was created as a contract between society and an inventor . . . .”).
2. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1996) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870)
(discussing the exclusive right granted to the inventor); Christopher S. Marchese,
Promoting the Progress of the Useful Arts by Narrowing Best Mode Disclosure Requirements in Patent Law, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 594-95 (1993) (“Inventors who
apply for patent protection and whose works qualify under the current act will
obtain the exclusive right and liberty to make, use and sell their inventions
. . . .”). For a discussion of the three conditions of patentability see infra notes 1825 and accompanying text.
4. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)
(“The applicant . . . who is willing to reveal to the public the substance of his discovery and ‘the best mode . . . of carrying out his invention,’ is granted ‘the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States.’”) (citations omitted); Thomas L. Irving et al., The Significant Federal Circuit Cases Interpreting Section 112, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 623 (1992) (“Disclosure by the inventor . . . is the consideration in the social contract between the
inventor and the government.”).
5. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186, modified,
289 U.S. 706 (1933) (explaining that granting a patent to an inventor “gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge”)
(citation omitted); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387
(1996) (stating that the government grants inventors “‘the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented inven-
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stated, disclosure is the quid pro quo for the patent grant..6
Inventors rightfully seek a scope of protection consistent
with their inventive contribution to the art.7 That is, the
scope of protection afforded depends upon the invention.
For example, a pioneering invention is entitled to a broad
scope of protection, while an incremental improvement warrants a more narrow scope.8 Inventors working in the unpredictable arts experience peculiar problems specifying the
breadth of the inventive contribution, and thus defining the
proper scope of protection.9
tion,’ in exchange for full disclosure of an invention”) (quoting 1 H. SCHWARTZ,
PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 33 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Keuhnle, supra note 1, at 604
(stating that the purpose of a patent is “to ensure that the inventor receives a limited monopoly on the invention in consideration for disclosing it to the public”).
As the Supreme Court explained in Kewanee Oil Co.:
When a patent is granted and the information in it is circulated to the
general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions
to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public
weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17
years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed,
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant
advances in the art.
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481. The GATT Implementing Legislation has
changed the term of a patent such that a patent granted on an application filed
on or after June 8, 1995 commences on the date of grant and expires 20 years
from the application filing date, or the date from which priority is claimed. See
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 531-533, 108 Stat. 4809,
4882-90 (1994).
6. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.01 (1996) (“The requirement of adequate
disclosure assures that the public receives ‘quid pro quo’ for the limited monopoly granted to the inventor.”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966)
(“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.”).
7. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT LAW, WHAT IS A PATENT? 1 (1981).
8. Cf. Stephen G. Whiteside, Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered Inventions: A Few Thoughts on Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1019, 1034 (1996) (“[I]nventions that represent dramatic technological advancements are given a greater range of equivalents than those that represent modification of existing inventions.”).
9. See Mark D. Schuman, Patent Protection for Microbiological Processes: Has
In re Argoudelis Been Mutated?, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1679, 1701 (1984) (concluding
that as unpredictability in an art increases, the scope of protection afforded in-
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The unpredictable arts are those technological disciplines
for which there is insufficient learning to explain, a priori,
the effect that changed variables will have within a system.10
Unpredictable arts might be newly emerging areas of scientific inquiry and discovery, or disciplines long recognized as
defying generalization within the confines of established scientific principles.11
Some disciplines might not suffer from the “unpredictable” label indefinitely. An emerging technology might be
deemed unpredictable only temporarily—as the emerging
technology is applied, it matures and its unpredictability
fades.12 As a result, the task of describing the incremental
innovations of a maturing technology increasingly becomes
definite and routine.
Other disciplines are perceived to be more persistently

ventions in that art should decrease); see also Garth Butterfield et al., Biotechnology
Protection and Licensing, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING & LITIGATION, at 235, 250 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 386, 1996).
10. One commentator has made an analogous argument concerning chemical inventions:
Special concerns arise with chemical patents because the properties of
chemical compounds can be less predictable than those of mechanical
inventions. When an inventor brings together old mechanical components, normally no new and unexpected result follows. In contrast, a
slight change in the structure or composition of a chemical compound
can have dramatic effects on its properties.
Julie A. Hokans, In re Bard: A New Approach to Obviousness of Chemical Compounds, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 205 (1995) (citations omitted).
11. Compare Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (Pat. Bd. App. & Int.
1985 1985) (classifying as unpredictable the then emerging use of hybridoma
technology to create monoclonal antibodies) with In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (discussing pharmacology as a discipline persistently deemed
unpredictable).
12. See Butterfield et al., supra note 8, at 243, 247; Allan G. Altera, Expanding
the Reissue Procedure: A Better Way To Do Business, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 209
(1993). One example of an emerging technology once branded as unpredictable,
but now routinely applied is the use of biotechnology, particularly hybridoma
technology, to create monoclonal antibodies. See Edward T. Lentz, Adequacy of
Disclosures of Biotechnology Inventions, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 314, 322 (1989) (acknowledging that the preparation of monoclonal antibodies is achievable by standard
techniques, and discussing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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unpredictable.13 Contributing to the perception of unpredictability is often a real or imagined interplay of a host of
unknowns and variables. As a result, it might be difficult to
accurately describe the breadth of a particular contribution
to the relevant art.
Within the law of patents, the unpredictable arts bring to
the fore the issue of the sufficiency of a patent applicant’s
disclosure.14 The issue arises when an applicant describes
and claims an invention broadly amidst a paucity of supporting data or examples.15 When the applicant has relied
upon unsupported inferences or reasoning by extrapolation
to generalize the invention, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) will likely reject the applicant’s
claim for insufficiency of disclosure.16
13. One discipline persistently perceived as “unpredictable” is pharmacology and the study of the effects of biologically active agents on the body. See,
e.g., In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (involving a patent claim of a discovery that certain already existing pharmaceutical compounds have an antidepressant effect when administered internally). Minor molecular modifications
in an active agent might cause profoundly different effects when administered to
a living organism. See, e.g., id.; cf. John C. Todaro, Enablement in Biotechnology
Cases After In re Goodman, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 37
(1994) (stating that the highly competitive nature of the biotechnology industry
often prompts patent applicants in that field to seek claims that are undeniably
broad).
14. The literature contains no systematic analysis of insufficiency of disclosure rejections as they are applied in the unpredictable arts. Although one commentator thoroughly catalogs the PTO’s various bases for rejection based upon
insufficiency of disclosure, the discussion is directed more generally to the PTO’s
sufficiency of disclosure challenges, and the corresponding burdens of proof,
without particular emphasis on the unpredictable arts or an analysis of the root
causes for those rejections. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure
Rejections (pts. 1-6), 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 217, 229, 261, 361, 387, 546 (1980).
Another commentator looks at the unique problems associated with meeting
the enablement requirement in rapidly developing arts, particularly biotechnology. See generally Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts—
Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 608 (1988). Ms. Winner does not, however,
emphasize the underlying causes of those rejections. See generally id.
15. See Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 455 (1994) (“In the competitive biotechnology industry, companies often seek broad claims to protect contemplated embodiments of
their inventions that have not yet been reduced to practice.”).
16. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the PTO’s
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The inventor’s generalized description might be improper when the applicant has broadly defined the invention, based upon arbitrarily selected features common
among the supporting examples, but not necessarily coincident with the inventive feature or result—that is, where the
applicant defines the invention based upon superficial
commonalities or reasoning by extrapolation from few examples.17 This Article proposes that such undue generalization can result in the creation of a false inventive genus, and
that the identification of such generalization will bring
greater consistency to rejections for insufficient disclosure.
While courts and the PTO have rejected patent claims on
grounds that incorporate the principles of the false inventive
genus, the rejections are often poorly articulated as the phenomenon of the false inventive genus has not been previously identified as such. Part I introduces the policy and
statutory requirements of patent disclosure, and explains the
complications of disclosure in the unpredictable arts. Part II
examines the evolution and present status of the sufficiency
of disclosure inquiry. Part III argues that current case law,
which is seemingly discordant for evaluating the sufficiency
rejection, based on an applicant’s failure to satisfy the enablement requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for all but the narrowest claims in a patent application for a
genetically engineered vaccine to protect against retroviruses). Such extrapolation or generalization leads to consideration of the “genus-species” relationship.
See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 12.03[3], at 12-67 (addressing genus-species relationship in the context of restriction requirements). The phrase has a rather specialized use within the field of patent law. For example, genus claims are broader
claims that embrace a variety of potential embodiments of the invention. Id. On
the other hand, species claims are narrower, and are usually limited to a single
embodiment or a single option for a particular variable. Id. As a result, the PTO
might make rejections of genus claims on the grounds that such claims are supported by an insufficient number of species of examples. See U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.02 (6th ed.
rev. 1 1995) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.] (“The lack of a working example, however, is a
factor to be considered, especially in a case involving an unpredictable and underdeveloped art.”). The terms are necessarily relative, thereby prompting a degree of ambiguity. CHISUM, supra note 6, § 12.03[3][b], at 12-69.
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining that some biotechnology companies define a patent broadly to protect yet-to-be discovered embodiments).
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of disclosure for the unpredictable arts, can be reconciled
under a new approach—the false inventive genus. Accordingly, this Article concludes that courts and the PTO should
more particularly identify instances of suspected reliance on
a false inventive genus. Challenges to the patentability or
validity of a claim on such a basis will focus attention more
effectively on the perceived shortcoming, thereby narrowing
the issues and facilitating their proper resolution.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
The three pillars of patentability are Utility, Invention,
and Disclosure.18 Utility and Invention are requirements directed to the invention itself—the subject matter for which
the applicant seeks an exclusive right; disclosure, on the
other hand, is more a formal requirement directed to the
content of the application.19
Congress implemented these requirements through the
Patent Act of 1952 (“Patent Act”),20 which states that a patentable invention: (1) must have some demonstrable practical use;21 (2) must be new;22 and (3) must be more than a
18. One commentator refers to the three white horses of patentability: “[a]n
applicant for a patent must come riding on ‘three white horses’; he must present
a clear disclosure of his invention, his invention must transcend the skill of the
art and it must be useful.” S. Wolffe, Adequacy of Disclosure as Regards Specific
Embodiment and Use of Invention, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 61, 61 (1959). Conceptualizing these requirements as pillars reinforces that they are requisite structural elements, without which the application for patent cannot stand.
19. See Bradford J. Duft, Patent Infringement and Biotechnology, 16 AIPLA Q.J.
339, 352 (1989) (“The invention as defined by the claims and the description of
the physical embodiment of the invention are two quite different things.”); see
also 3 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9:1, at 11
(3d ed. 1985) (“It should be borne in mind that patents are creatures of statute . . . and that patent specifications, drawings, and claims must be drafted to
conform and be in harmony with the statutory and Patent Office requirements.”).
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
21. Patentable subject matter is defined as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
22. The Patent Act’s novelty requirement precludes patentability of inventions that have been invented by others, or that have been publicly disclosed or
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mere obvious alteration or improvement over what was previously known in the relevant art.23 The Patent Act also defines the disclosure requirement.24 This requirement does
not address the merits of the invention. Rather, the disclosure requirement states what the applicant must tender in
exchange for the patent grant. Disclosure is a contrivance
separate from the invention; but like the invention, it can be
dispositive of the application, or of the validity or enforceability of the patent.25
This part introduces the disclosure requirement and describes its application to the unpredictable arts. First, this
part explains the policies underlying the disclosure requirement. Second, this part discusses the statutory requirements
of patent disclosure. Third, this part addresses the complications of disclosure in the unpredictable arts. Finally, this
part analyzes the application of the disclosure requirement
to the unpredictable arts.
A. The Policies of Disclosure
The policies underlying the disclosure requirement are
born of the constitutional mandate that Congress provide a
framework for granting copyrights and patents.26 In a rare
instance in which the Founding Fathers coupled an enumerated power with a specific objective, the Constitution empowers Congress “to promote Progress of . . . useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”27 True to the constitutional
mandate, the promotion of the useful arts has been the objecsold more than one year prior to the filing date of the application. 35 U.S.C. §
102.
23. The Patent Act’s nonobviousness requirement demands that the subject
of the grant be an inventive contribution to the art; that is, something that would
not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention
was made. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
25. See, e.g., LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, § 10:17, at 234.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Id.

156

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:147

tive of the various patent statutes and the body of law interpreting them.28
The Founding Fathers thought it equitable to reward inventors with the grant of a limited exclusive right.29 They
acknowledged society’s interests by specifying that the grant
of such rights be structured to promote the progress of the
“useful arts.”30 In exchange for this exclusive right, Congress, beginning with the Patent Act of 1790,31 has continually insisted upon full and fair disclosure of both the invention and the exclusive right claimed by the innovator.32
Congress has thus implemented a patent system that balances the private interests of the inventor with the public
benefits of disclosure.33
By requiring applicants to identify the invention for
which they seek an exclusive right,34 Congress seeks to protect the private interests of innovators by allowing them to
give notice of the exclusive right, and “inform the public
during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted.”35
Just as inventors benefit from a public disclosure of their
28. See generally, CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.01-.03; LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, §
1:8-:9.
29. See Canady, supra note 15, at 456 (“To encourage the development of
technology, the federal government grants patent protection to those who invent
products or processes in exchange for public disclosure of their inventions.”).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). According to Mr. Madison:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at
common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
cases, with the claims of individuals.
Id.
31. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
32. See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.02.
33. See, e.g., Matheson v. Campbell, 69 F. 597, 604 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895) (“The
consideration received from the disclosure of the discovery to the public is the
foundation of the right to the monopoly of the patent.”), reh’g granted, 77 F. 280,
281 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), rev’d on other grounds, 78 F. 910 (2d Cir. 1897).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
35. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
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exclusive right, so too does the public. First, disclosure
teaches those in the relevant art how to make and use the invention, thereby enabling the public to exploit the invention
at the end of the patent term.36 Second, the disclosure requirement assures an immediate contribution to the art, so
that others might make improvements and advances during
the term of the patent.37 Finally, disclosure protects the public against undue, ad hoc extension of the exclusive right.38
Consequently, through the disclosure requirement (including the presentation of particularized claims),39 Congress assures that the public will receive quid pro quo for the
patent grant; that is, society gains a detailed enabling disclosure, as well as fair notice of the scope of the exclusive right,
and protection against undue extension of that right.40
36. See, e.g., id. (stating that the patentee must describe the invention in
enough detail so that any person skilled in the art may construct and use it after
the patent expires).
37. See Paul M. Janicke, Patent Disclosure: Some Problems and Current Developments, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3 (1971); see also In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A.
1960), overruled on other grounds by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 943-46 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(discussing the level of usefulness required to be considered a contribution to the
art). In Nelson, the court harkened back to historical texts, including PHILLIPS,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (1837):
There are two objects in view in making a specification. As the law
grants the patentee a monopoly, and not only awards damages, but inflicts a penalty for violation of the exclusive privilege, it very equitably
requires that the invention shall be so described in the specification, that
every person may, by examining it, know what the patentee claims, and be
able to distinguish what may be an infringement. The other object of
the specification is to give the public the advantage of the invention after the
expiration of the patent. . . . [W]e add to Phillips’ explanation that a further public advantage from the specification is the addition it makes to
technical literature immediately upon issuance of the patent, without
waiting for its expiration.
280 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,
484-85 (1944) (“The claim is the measure of the grant . . . [and] is required to be
specific for the very purpose of protecting the public against extension of the
scope of the patent.”) (citation omitted).
39. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining “particularized
claims”).
40. See, e.g., Universal Oil, 322 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court explained:
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the
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B. Statutory Requirements of Disclosure
To fulfill the foregoing objectives of the patent system,
Congress devised section 112 of the Patent Act (“section
112”).41 Paragraph one of section 112 very explicitly states
the requirements of disclosure: that the application contain
a written description of the invention sufficient to enable an
artisan, skilled in the relevant art, to make and use the invention, and that it set forth the inventor’s best mode42 of putting the invention into practice.43
Compliance with the above is often analyzed from the
perspective of three independent requirements: (1) written
description; (2) enablement; and (3) best mode.44 Satisfaction of the first requirement, a written description, would
seem a rather plain and innocuous task. Nonetheless, the
United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret. But the quid pro quo is
disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled
in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The
basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention
with substantial utility.”).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
42. Id. “Best mode” refers to the patent applicant’s requirement to disclose
“the best mode of practicing an invention [which] refers to the component parts
or ingredients or parameters that an inventor considers to work particularly well
with the invention.” Roy E. Hofer & L. Ann Fitzgerald, New Rules for Old Problems: Defining Contours of the Best Mode Requirement in Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 2309, 2349 n.1 (1995).
43. The first paragraph of section 112 states the disclosure requirements
which the application, also referred to as “the specification,” must fulfill:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added).
44. Id.
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written description is an independent, and sometimes fateful, requirement within the unpredictable arts.45 Indeed, it
has been urged that treating the call for a written description
as an independent requirement, rather than as a mere modifier, is anomalous, and if appropriate at all, only so in complex chemical cases.46
The second requirement, enablement, is the most pregnant with ambiguity,47 and is the birthplace of this Article.
Intertwined with satisfaction of the enablement requirement
is the obligation to teach one of skill in the art how-to-make
and how-to-use the invention. This, too, would seem a plain
and innocuous task, but for the complexity of the unpredictable arts.48
The third, and final, requirement of disclosure, best
mode, simply obligates the applicant to disclose the invention fully, including the relevant tricks of the trade as it
were, so as not to conceal within the one hand, what is seemingly revealed in the other.49 If the inventor knows of spe45. M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2161 (“The written description requirement is
separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.”) (citations omitted); see
also In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is possible for a specification to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is claimed, and still
not describe that invention.”); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
46. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To
the uninitiated, it may seem anomalous that the first paragraph of [section 112]
has been interpreted as requiring a separate ‘description of the invention,’ when
the invention is, necessarily, the subject matter defined in the claims under consideration.”); see also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Markey, C. J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is “incongruous,” and “exaltive of form over substance” to conclude that the disclosure of an invention in such “clear, concise and
exact terms as to enable its practice” somehow fails to meet a distinct written description requirement), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
47. Cf. Canady, supra note 15, at 458 (“Biotechnology companies often encounter frustration when trying to satisfy the enablement requirement.”) (citation
omitted).
48. See Lentz, supra note 12, at 315-16 (acknowledging that the enablement
requirement presents special problems for patents disclosing and claiming biotechnology inventions); see also Canady, supra note 15, at 458 (explaining that satisfaction of the enablement requirement is much more challenging with chemical
and biological inventions than with mechanical innovations).
49. See, e.g., In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“Manifestly, the sole
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cific techniques, instrumentalities, or characteristics (referred
to as preferred embodiments) for best putting the invention
into practice, the best mode requirement mandates disclosure of that information to the public.50
The second paragraph of section 112 states that the specification shall conclude with one or more claims “particularly
point[ing] out and distinctly claim[ing]” the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.51 Claims are
single sentence descriptions that specify the measure, or establish the metes and bounds, of the exclusive right.52 In so
doing, the claims define the outer limits of the exclusive
right asserted, thereby putting the public on notice so as to
avoid infringement.53 Similarly, the claims commit the patentee to a particular scope of protection, thus preventing
improper ad hoc extension of the exclusive right.54
purpose of this latter requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of
their inventions which they have in fact conceived.”).
50. Marchese, supra note 2, at 599; see also Gay, 309 F.2d at 772. Because best
mode rejections are not peculiar to the unpredictable arts, this Article does not
discuss them further. See Lentz, supra note 12, at 315 (“The requirement to set
forth the best mode of an invention seems no more often or greater a problem in
cases of biotechnology inventions than in typical chemical cases.”); see also
Whiteside, supra note 7, at 1028 (“One particularly difficult issue presented by
biotechnological inventions has been the satisfaction of the enablement requirement.”).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
52. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, §§ 8.02, 8.06. According to one
commentator:
The only known (or at least acceptable) way so far to particularly point
out and distinctly claim an invention in a statutory class is by means of
an English sentence. This is unfortunate, because many of the problems
in claim drafting stem from problems in writing English and in the
meanings of words.
JOHN L. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 7 (2d ed. 1974).
53. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 8.03.
54. Id. § 8.03[1]; see also id. § 8.03 (“On occasion, courts, including the Supreme Court, have failed to distinguish carefully the requirement of definiteness,
which claims must meet, from the requirement of enablement, which the disclosure of the specification must meet.”). Except insofar as the obligation to claim
the invention is confused with the obligation to disclose the invention, claims are
not addressed further in this Article.
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C. Application of the Disclosure Requirement to the
Unpredictable Arts
As noted above, compliance with the disclosure requirement can be dispositive of the application, regardless of the
merits of the invention.55 The disclosure, however, can only
negatively affect patentability; that is, where the specification fails to meet the requirements of section 112. This section explains the application of the disclosure requirement to
the unpredictable arts. This section first introduces the
commonly acknowledged complications of disclosure in the
unpredictable arts. This section then examines how the
courts and the PTO address those complications, and how
their treatment might affect the scope of protection an applicant is ultimately granted.
1. The Complications of Disclosure in the
Unpredictable Arts
a. Terminology and Language
Describing even the simplest of inventions is often a challenge—even more so with inventions that are either unpredictable or perceived as such.56 After all, inventions are, by
definition, new and non-obvious.57 As a result, they often do
not fit neatly within established theories or paradigms. This
amorphism can frustrate attempts to comply with the Patent
Act’s mandate that disclosure be in full, clear, concise, and
exact terms.58 For example, in Autogiro Co. of America v.

55. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, §
9:1.
56. See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indust., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113,
1117 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“‘The specification and claims of a patent . . . constitute one
of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy.’”) (citation omitted).
57. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
58. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 12, at 315 (“The written description requirement is sometimes more problematic [in biotechnology,] owing to the common
use in patent claims of words and phrases that may be jargon or otherwise not
widely understood, or that may be subjective or functional.”).
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United States,59 the United States Court of Claims60 acknowledged the inherent difficulties of the disclosure requirement.
The Autogiro court observed that the process of discovery
necessarily precedes description of that discovery, and that
language, terminology, and nomenclature necessarily lag invention.61 For this reason, the Court of Claims would grant
an applicant latitude in creating and defining the terminology of the invention.62
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”)
also acknowledged the occasional incompatibility of language and innovation.63 In so doing, the C.C.P.A. refused to
59. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
60. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which came
into being in 1982, assumed the responsibilities of the United States Court of
Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”).
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 16, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28, 35 & 41 U.S.C.) (1982).
The Federal Circuit adopted the body of law represented by the holdings of the
Court of Claims and the C.C.P.A. in South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Federal Circuit has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all appeals from the federal district courts, the PTO, and the ITC
arising under the patent laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c), 1295
(1994); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
61. As the court in Autogiro observed:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series
of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to
satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to
words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily
filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe
it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.
To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
384 F.2d at 397 (citations omitted). The rule that an applicant is entitled to be his
or her own lexicographer continues to receive explicit endorsement. See, e.g.,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (citing Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397). The rule acknowledges that new terms are required to describe new discoveries. Id. This,
too, is a long since acknowledged concept: “I am not yet so lost in lexicography
as to forget that words are the daughter of earth, and that things are the sons of
heaven.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, Preface to DICTIONARY (1755), quoted in J. BARTLETT,
BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (16th ed. 1992).
62. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397.
63. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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penalize inventors for ambiguities or inadequacies of language in a patent application.64 Nonetheless, the inventor
must thoroughly and accurately define any new terms, and
must use such terms consistently throughout the specification and the claims.65
b. Scientific Principles
Another challenge to disclosure in the unpredictable arts
arises where the principles relied upon to explain or describe
the operation of an invention, are new, untested, and yet to
be accepted by the scientific community.66 In such a situation, the inventive principle itself, or at least the inventor’s
description of it, might be looked upon with suspicion.
64. In Fisher, the court explained:
We recognize a problem in determining differences over the prior art
where the claim uses language which is now accepted and precise but
which was not used in the art at the time the prior-art references were
published. However, were we to require that claims speak in the language of the prior art, we would be prohibiting the use of newer and
frequently more precise language of the present art.
427 F.2d at 838; see also Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 642
(E.D. Pa. 1962). As the Benger Laboratories court noted:
Nothing in the law requires courts to deny a patent to the inventor of a
new and useful product merely because laboratory technique has not
advanced to a point where the chemical structure can be recognized
and described. All that is necessary is that the patentee make as full
disclosure as he reasonably can and that he describe the product with
sufficient particularity that it can be identified and that those who are
interested in its manufacture are enabled to determine what will and
what will not infringe.
Id.
65. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (“The caveat is that any special
definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.”) (citing
Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
66. R.H. Comey Co. v. Monte Christi Corp., 17 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1927)
(“When [experimentation] is necessary, especially where, as here, it is claimed
the art is new, courts will carefully appraise the adequacy of the disclosures and
sustain or strike down the patent accordingly.”) (citations omitted); see also In re
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (suggesting that when the operation
alleged conflicts with recognized principles or is not amenable to testing by
known scientific principles, applicants will be required to demonstrate the
workability and utility of the device and make clear the principles by which it
operates)
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Courts or the PTO might then treat the invention as unpredictable, or not amenable to generalization, and question the
sufficiency of the disclosure. When the subject of a patent
application is among the unpredictable arts, and the application contains claims covering subject matter beyond that illustrated in the disclosure, courts and the PTO are likely to
scrutinize closely the disclosure for enablement.67
Unpredictable factors are more prevalent in some disciplines, thereby complicating the sufficiency of disclosure
analysis and casting suspicion on broad claims to inventions
within such disciplines.68 For example, while electrical and
mechanical inventions are generally considered as among
the predictable arts,69 inventions involving chemistry70—
67. Cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming rejection of
broad generic claims in an unpredictable art, which claims were supported by
only a single working example).
68. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also M.P.E.P., supra
note 16, § 2164.03.
69. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839. In Fisher, the C.C.P.A. observed:
In cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical
elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense
that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty
and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most
chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement
obviously varies with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.
Id.; accord Ex parte Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1823 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1988) (“noting that a single embodiment may provide broad enablement in cases
involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, but that
more is required in cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical
reactions and physiological activity); see also Matheson v. Campbell, 78 F. 910,
916 (2d Cir. 1897) (“[A patentee cannot] speculate on the equivalents of his
claimed invention and thereby oblige the public to resort to experiments in order
to determine the scope of the claims of his patent.”).
70. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1946)
(“[W]hile analogy is at times useful, organic chemistry is essentially an experimental science and results are often uncertain, unpredictable, and unexpected.”);
Naylor v. Alsop Process Co., 168 F. 911, 919 (8th Cir. 1909) (“[R]easoning by
analogy in a complex field like chemistry is very much more restricted than in a
simple field like mechanics.”); Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F.
Supp. 370, 432 (D. Del. 1980) (“[I]n the notably unpredictable fields of catalysis
and organic chemistry small changes can yield quite significant results”).

1996]

FALSE INVENTIVE GENUS

165

including physiological utility or therapeutic uses of compounds,71 living materials such as microorganisms or cultured cells,72 and other aspects of biochemistry and genetic
manipulation—are generally categorized as among the unpredictable arts.73 Consequently, broad claims to inventions
among the latter group of disciplines often receive greater
scrutiny.
71. See, e.g., Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1991) (finding an invention which concerned pharmaceutical activity
to be relatively unpredictable because there was no record of analogous activity
for similar compounds); see also In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (addressing therapeutical compositions comprising mixtures of extracts from plants
of various enumerated families); In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (addressing pharmaceutical compositions having “antidepressant activity”); Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Mossinghoff, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (D.D.C. 1984) (distinguishing enablement requirement for claimed compounds from claimed
therapeutic use: disclosure requirements for claimed therapeutic use of known
compounds being greater.); Ex parte Kranz, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1991) (addressing treatment of cancer); Ex parte Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1908 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986) (addressing treatment of cancer); Ex parte
Powers, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 924 (Bd. App. 1982) (“[D]isclosure . . . lacks any information as to host, dosage level, mode or routes of administration, or how to
prepare the composition for administration.”); cf. In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing less stringent requirement for disclosure of “how to
use” the invention for claims directed to compounds as compared to claims for
therapeutic use); accord Bey v. Kollonitsch, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 454, 459 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1981).
72. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ex parte Humphreys,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992); Ex parte Hata, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1652 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988) (deposit of microorganisms required if
not shown to be “not rarely occurring”). But see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding it is not undue experimentation to make and screen monoclonal antibodies by hybridoma method).
73. See, e.g., In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding single example in support of claims for method for producing mammalian peptides
in any plant cell insufficient enablement and acknowledging articles showing
“great unpredictability in the art”); Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1823 (“[T]his case
involves highly unpredictable factors including unique, delicate, and unpredictable biochemical and genetic actions.”) (citing examiner’s Answer with approval).
This Article uses the terms “chemical inventions” and “chemical cases” to include inventions and claims involving physiological utility or therapeutic uses of
compounds, living materials such as microorganisms or cultured cells, and other
aspects of biochemistry and genetic manipulation.
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One might view this enhanced scrutiny of the unpredictable arts as merely healthy skepticism of disciplines that
trace their roots to the medieval practice of alchemy, which,
despite its association with chicanery and fraud, is the forerunner of modern chemistry and pharmacology.74 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to examine the effect that such enhanced scrutiny might have on the scope of protection
afforded an invention.
2. The Proper Inquiry: Unpredictable Factors in the
Art
Rather than branding entire disciplines unpredictable,
the C.C.P.A. has commented that it “would prefer to see the
dichotomy which lawyers find in the chemical and mechanical cases ‘denominated a dichotomy between predictable
and unpredictable factors in the art.’ However, we recognize that the realities of chemical cases often result in unpredictability.”75 The court’s attempt to clarify this issue might
be interpreted as acknowledging that not all chemical inventions are inherently unpredictable.
3. Assessing Unpredictability and Sufficiency of
Disclosure
a. Standards of Disclosure and Burdens of Proof
The mere prospect that an invention might be denominated “unpredictable,” thereby rendering broad claims suspect, raises a preliminary issue: whether inventions that
74. See N. IRVING SAX AND RICHARD J. LEWIS, SR., HAWLEY’S CONDENSED
CHEMICAL DICTIONARY 31 (11th ed. 1987) (defining alchemy as: “The predecessor
of chemistry practiced from as early as 500 B.C. through the 16th century. Its
two principal goals were transmutation of the base metals into gold and discovery of a universal remedy. Modern chemistry grew out of alchemy by gradual
stages.”).
75. In re Bowen, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 50 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (citing In re Cook,
439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). The distinction is frequently overlooked,
however. Judge Rich wrote the opinion in both Bowen and Cook, yet more recently wrote, “it is well settled that patent applicants are not required to disclose
every species encompassed by their claims, even in an unpredictable art.” In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
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possess unpredictable factors are subject to a more rigorous
standard of disclosure.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals has acknowledged
that the sufficiency of the patent disclosure is more often
called into question in chemical cases.76 Nonetheless, the
C.C.P.A. has refuted the suggestion that there is a more rigorous standard of disclosure, noting that “the patent code
does not prescribe a different standard [of disclosure] between ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ cases; nor does this court apply different standards in such cases.”77 Nonetheless, the
burden of proof, as to whether an applicant has satisfied that

76. Ex parte Vickers, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 607, 608 (Bd. App. 1941); see also Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839 (M.D. Fla. 1976), aff’d, 584
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978). In Nationwide Chemical Corp., the court distinguished
treatment of generic mechanical claims from generic claims in chemical and biological arts and acknowledged that:
[O]ne skilled in these chemical and biological arts cannot always reasonably predict how different chemical compounds and elements might
behave under varying circumstances. Thus, in so-called ‘chemical’ patent law practice, the claims of a patent are limited by the scope of what
the disclosure reasonably teaches to one skilled in the art.
Id. Furthermore, as the Vickers court explained:
[T]he rejection is that the claim is broader than the invention. This
ground of rejection is frequently applied in purely chemical cases where
equivalents are not obvious, but is very infrequently applied to strictly
mechanical cases . . . . The reason for the distinction made between
chemical and mechanical cases is because in the mechanical cases the
equivalents are obvious to any mechanic.”
53 U.S.P.Q. at 608.
77. In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978) (citing In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 589-90 (C.C.P.A. 1972)); see also Ex
parte DesOrmeaux, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2040, 2043-44 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992)
(“[W]e are unaware of any distinction in law as to the enablement or description
requirements of the first paragraph of [section] 112 based on whether the subject
matter is chemical or non chemical.”). But see United States v. Telectronics, Inc.,
857 F.2d 778, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Fisher and Bowen both involved chemical reactions, recognized by our predecessor court as having a high degree of unpredictability and therefore requiring an increased enablement disclosure.”); Hormone
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1386 (N.D. Cal.
1988), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
cert. dismissed, 499 U.S. 955 (1991) (“Patents concerning chemical reactions and
biological activity, like the patent in suit, generally involve unpredictable factors
thus enable a narrower range of claims.”).
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disclosure requirement can vary. Courts have acknowledged the propriety of shifting the burden of proof, depending upon the unpredictability of an invention.78
b. Measuring the Sufficiency of Disclosure
The prospect that the burden of proof can shift, depending upon the perceived unpredictability within an art, raises
a more challenging question: how does one reliably measure the sufficiency of disclosure in disciplines fraught with
unpredictability? The proper inquiry is whether there is a
reasonable correlation between the scope of enablement
provided by the disclosure and the scope of the claims.79 In
other words, whether the specification contains a description
of the invention that would enable one of ordinary skill in
the relevant art to make and use the invention throughout
the range of embodiments embraced by the claim.80
Confirmation that the scope of enablement correlates
with the scope of the claim is not an arbitrary hurdle erected
exclusively before the invention possessing unpredictable
factors.81 Rather, it is a recognition that, regardless of disci78. See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing the role of unpredictability in shifting the burden of proof as between the PTO and applicant);
see also In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
79. See infra note 238 and accompanying text; see also In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d
488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1981); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that the first paragraph of section 112 requires that the scope of protection sought bear a reasonable correlation
to the scope of enablement provided by the specification); In re Borkowski, 422
F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970). As the Borkowski court explained:
[I]f the ‘enabling’ disclosure of a specification is not commensurate in
scope with the subject matter encompassed by a claim, that fact does
not render the claim imprecise or indefinite or otherwise not in compliance with the second paragraph of § 112; rather, the claim is based on an
insufficient disclosure. . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
80. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Although not
explicitly stated in section 112, to be enabling, the specification of a patent must
teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”) (citations omitted).
81. The ability to draw generalizations not expressly supported by a disclosure was addressed with characteristic eloquence by Judge Learned Hand:
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pline, enablement contemplates predictability, or at least the
ability to duplicate what the applicant claims to have invented.82
Early in the post-World War II era, the C.C.P.A. gave
voice to this principle in In re Chilowsky.83 Chilowsky involved claims directed to the use of nuclear fission to generate useful energy.84 The PTO had rejected the claims on the
grounds of inoperativeness and indefiniteness.85
The
C.C.P.A. observed, however, that neither the examiner nor
the Board of Appeals had identified any specific feature
shown to be, or considered to be, inoperative, but rather
merely objected to the speculative nature of the disclosure.86
Accordingly, the Chilowsky court concluded that the stanAn inventor is, of course, not confined to the exact details of his disclosure, else his patent would be of small value. The extent to which he
may generalize it depends, not only upon the surrounding pressure of
the art, but the extent to which the variations which he wishes to cover
in his claims, are themselves within the initiative of a journeyman in the
art. For the inventor’s contribution must be a sufficient guide in itself,
and its extent is limited to such substitutes for any disclosed element, as
the art needs no help to find. . . . An inventor must do more than give
cues for future experiment. Unless he is dealing with elements whose
action and reaction is known and certain, he is bound to disclose how
the combination will operate. A patent is the reward of a tested contribution to the art, not of a pregnant surmise or promising hypothesis.
Leonard, Inc. v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1918) (citations omitted). Judge Hand’s comments also show that this particular inquiry
is not peculiar to the unpredictable arts, because the issue before the Leonard
court was whether the disclosure supported an assertion of the claims against
alleged equivalents in a mechanical invention. See generally Leonard, Inc. v.
Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584 (2d Cir. 1918).
82. Id.; see also In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 701 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (saying description must provide measure of predictability for the utility described for the
invention); Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839, aff’d, 584
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978) (“With respect to generic claims to chemical and biological inventions, the scope of the claim is limited to what those skilled in the art
could reasonably predict from the inventor’s disclosure.”).
83. In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
84. Id. at 459.
85. Id. at 460. The examiner had argued that in order for there to be patentability for generating power by nuclear fission, “there must be conclusive
proof” that the disclosed reactor can be constructed and operated. Id. at 461.
86. Id. at 461.
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dards by which operativeness of the invention and enablement are judged should be no different in emerging or unpredictable technologies than in other more established and
predictable technologies.87
Nonetheless, within developing disciplines, unpredictability, alone, might be sufficient to cast doubt on the scope
of enablement.88 Still greater scrutiny—even a presumption
of a lack of utility or of inoperability—is appropriate where
the alleged operation is in actual conflict with recognized
scientific principles,89 or otherwise commonly acknowledged
87. Chilowsky, 229 F.2d at 461-62. The Chilowsky court said that:
[T]he same principles should apply in determining operativeness and
sufficiency of disclosure in applications relating to nuclear fission as in
other cases. There appears to be no basis in the statutes or decisions for
requiring any more conclusive evidence of operativeness in one type of
case than another. The character and amount of evidence needed may
vary, depending on whether the alleged operation described in the application appears to accord with or to contravene established scientific
principles or to depend upon principles alleged but not generally recognized; but the degree of certainty as to the ultimate fact of operativeness . . . should be the same in all cases.
Id.
88. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971). In Marzocchi, the court
observed:
In the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the well
known unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to
create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim. This will especially
be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific principles.
Id. at 223.
89. Id.; see also In re Chilowski, 229 F.2d at 462 (“[I]f the alleged operation
seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific principle as, for example,
where an applicant purports to have discovered a machine producing perpetual
motion, the presumption of inoperativeness is so strong that very clear evidence
is required to overcome it.”); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(claims for a perpetual motion machine rejected under both sections 101 and
112), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); cf. In
re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the claimed utility,
treatment of lymphatic congestion, is not “incredible”). In a corresponding footnote, the court identified a series of cases addressing the issue of whether the
claimed utility was speculative, incredible, esoteric, factually misleading, or contrary to the common knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g.,
In re Houghton, 433 F.2d 820, 820 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (flying machine operating on
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as the “subject matter of much humbuggery and fraud.”90
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE INQUIRY
The sufficiency of disclosure inquiry derives from the requirement of section 112, first paragraph that an applicant
describe his or her invention.91 More particularly, the disclosure must satisfy the written description, enablement, and
how-to-make-and-use requirements.92 The sufficiency of
disclosure inquiry has occasionally suffered from the failure
to distinguish the descriptive requirements of the first paragraph of section 112 from the definitional requirements of
the second paragraph—as seen in rejections for undue
breadth—and from the requirement that the invention be
useful93—as seen in rejections for including inoperative embodiments. This part examines the evolution of sufficiency
of disclosure rejections from those decrying undue breadth
and faulting the inclusion of inoperative embodiments to the
current rejections for insufficiency of disclosure alleging the
need for undue experimentation.

“flapping or flutter function”); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (control of aging process); In re Buting, 418 F.2d 540 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (treating cancer);
In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (hair restorer); In re Citron, 325 F.2d
254 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (treating cancer)). Id. at 1159 n.5.
90. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled on other grounds
by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The Nelson court also cited In re Oberweger. Id. (citing In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1940)) (“[W]herein an
invention consisting of various admixtures of such things as bone marrow, aromatic oils and alcohol was held lacking in utility for the specified purpose of
growing hair.”).
91. See, e.g., In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that
whether the claims read on subject matter for which the specification is enabling
is an issue of paragraph one of section 112).
92. The various insufficiency of disclosure rejections have been categorized
elsewhere. See generally Walterscheid (pt. III), supra note 14.
93. See, e.g., In re Frilette, 423 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that rejection
that claims were “too broad” confused the requirements of the first and second
paragraphs of section 112, and section 101 (utility)); see generally CHISUM, supra
note 6, §§ 7.02-.03, 8.03.
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A. Undue Breadth: Distinguishing the Obligation to Define
from the Obligation to Describe the Invention
In the past, the PTO has rejected patent applications for
insufficiency of disclosure by alleging that the inventor’s
claims were unduly broad.94 Such “undue breadth” rejections are now disfavored, as they fail to distinguish between
an alleged inadequacy of the claims or the disclosure.95
The sufficiency of disclosure analysis has often been confounded by the failure to distinguish the obligation to define, or delineate the boundaries of the invention, from the
obligation to disclose or describe the invention.96 The applicant’s definition of the invention must “particularly point
out and distinctly claim” what the applicant regards as the
invention.97 Because the applicant has the obligation of defining the invention in the first instance, the application—
and the sufficiency of the disclosure—must be analyzed with
respect to the invention as claimed.98
1. The Claim Defines That Which Must Separately
Be Described
When considering whether an application sufficiently
describes an invention, one must first determine what the
invention is.99 The first paragraph of section 112 requires
that the applicant enable one of skill in the art to make and
94. See, e.g., In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Frilette, 423
F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
95. See Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909; Frilette, 423 F.2d at 1400-01.
96. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
97. The obligation to define the invention is found in the first paragraph of
section 112, and obligates the applicant to define the exclusive right sought by
“particularly point[ing] out and distinctly claim[ing]” that which the applicant
regards as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text (explaining the statutory requirements of disclosure). The sufficiency of
the disclosure must meet the strictures of the first paragraph of section 112. See
supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text (explaining the statutory requirements
of disclosure).
98. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501-02 (citing In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
99. Id.
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use the invention; the second paragraph requires that the
applicant define the scope of the invention.100 Because an
invention must first be defined in order to ascertain whether
it is enabled, a proper analysis for compliance with section
112 must start with the second paragraph.101
The test for compliance with section 112, second paragraph, is whether the claims “set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity.”102
If so, the applicant has satisfied the requirements of the
second paragraph of section 112.103 If, however, the “enabling” disclosure of a specification is not commensurate in
scope with the subject matter encompassed by a claim, the
claim is based on an insufficient disclosure, and the issue becomes one of compliance with section 112, first paragraph.104
In such situations, it is important to distinguish the requirement of definiteness, which the claims must meet, from enablement, which the disclosure of the specification must
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also, Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 874-75 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). In Miles, the court explained:
The “distinctly claiming” requirement means that the claims must have
a clear and definite meaning when construed in the light of the complete patent document. Section 112 thus ensures definiteness of claim
language.
The test for definiteness is whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.
If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those
skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, [section] 112 demands no
more. The degree of precision necessary for adequate claims is a function of the nature of the subject matter.
Id. (citations omitted). Put another way:
If the scope of subject matter embraced by a claim is clear, and if the
applicant has not otherwise indicated that he intends the claim to be of
a different scope, then the claim does particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909.
103. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501-02.
104. Id.
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meet.105
2. Undue Breadth Fails to Distinguish Definitional
from Descriptive Faults
The distinct requirements of the first and second paragraphs of section 112 have occasionally been muddled.106
The result is highlighted in the debate over whether claims
might properly be rejected for undue breadth.107 Because of
inherent ambiguities and resulting confusion, the undue
breadth rejection was explicitly spurned by the C.C.P.A. in
In re Borkowski.108
105. See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03; see also In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 261
(C.C.P.A. 1963). As the Fuetterer court explained: “[w]e think the examiner’s rejection of the instant claims as failing to enable the public to ‘determine operable
proportions’ is misplaced. Such is the function of the invention description and
not that of the claims.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But see
General Electric Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In General Electric, the court noted:
Claims 35 and 36 fail to structurally recite, in any form, transformer 81.
This element is an essential element of the combination for without
transformer 81, or some equivalent means, the claimed combination is
inoperative. . . . Since the combination as claimed is inoperative for its
claimed purpose, the patentee has failed to distinctly claim the disclosed invention as required by the second paragraph of [section] 112.
Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
106. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03 (discussing several Supreme
Court cases confusing the distinction); Levin, supra note 67 (explaining that some
courts confuse the first and second paragraphs of section 112). Much of the confusion can be attributed to the fact that under prior patent acts the enablement
requirement and the “distinctly claiming” requirement were expressed within
the same sentence. With the Patent Act of 1952, however, those requirements
were expressed in separate paragraphs of section 112. See supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the Patent Act of 1952). One commentator has
explained:
In the old statute, the requirement for a claim pointing out what the applicant regarded as his invention appeared as a clause in the same sentence relating to the description, which led to some confounding of the
nature of the two requirements in a few decisions. In the new statute,
the clause relating to the claim has been made a separate paragraph to
emphasize the distinction between the description and the claim, and
the language has been modified.
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 157, 186 (1993).
107. See, e.g., In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Fuetterer,
319 F.2d 259 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
108. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

1996]

FALSE INVENTIVE GENUS

175

In Borkowski, the examiner had rejected the claims in issue under both the first and second paragraphs of section
112; specifically, the examiner asserted that the claims were
“based on an insufficient disclosure,” and failed to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.”109 The
court suggested that the undue breadth rejection begs the
question as to whether the applicant has failed to enable the
invention as broadly as it is claimed, or has failed to claim
clearly and with particularity that which is disclosed and
presumably enabled.110
The C.C.P.A. has also made clear its view that undue
breadth is an ambivalent rejection from which neither the
applicant nor appellate tribunals can decipher the deficiency
alleged.111 Furthermore, the C.C.P.A. has observed that the
undue breadth rejection might suggest inoperativeness—
that embodiments within the scope of the claims lack utility—and thus an implicit rejection under section 101.112 Accordingly, the undue breadth rejection, without more, is inappropriate and should not stand.113 In fact, the rejection is
more appropriately made based upon the first paragraph of
Section 112.114
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Frilette, 423 F.2d at 1400-01.
112. Id. (“Thus, while citing [section] 112, the board’s discussion of the factual grounds for the rejection indicates, as does the examiner’s, a concern with
alleged inoperativeness or lack of utility of embodiments embraceable within the
scope of the language of the claims.”).
113. Id. (remanding for clarification a rejection of claims under section 112
asserting claims were “too broad”).
114. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he claim is properly rejected for what used to be known as ‘undue breadth,’ but has since been
appreciated as being, more accurately, based upon the first paragraph of [section] 112.”); see generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16 (eliminating section 706.03(z)
from the previous edition, which expressly provided grounds for rejecting claims
for “Undue Breadth,” particularly among the unpredictable arts such as those
involving chemical reactions). Similarly, section 706.03(n) has also been eliminated from the most recent edition of the M.P.E.P. See generally id. That section,
entitled “Correspondence of Claim & Disclosure” was often used by examiners
in tandem with section 706.03(z) to reject claims based upon the first paragraph
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Sufficiency of disclosure, then, addresses compliance
with the requirements of section 112, first paragraph. Within
the first paragraph, however, there are the three subsidiary
requirements particularly relevant in the unpredictable arts:
(1) written description, (2) enablement, and (3) how to make
and use the invention.115 Satisfaction of these requirements
is often debated in conjunction with the invention’s utility.116
B. Inoperative Embodiments and the Utility Component of
Disclosure
Another now disfavored form of insufficiency of disclosure rejection is the allegation that the claim embraces inoperative embodiments. As with undue breadth, inoperative
embodiment rejections confuse the respective requirements
of the first and second paragraphs of section 112, as well as
the utility requirement of section 101.117
The invention and the description of the invention are
separate contrivances:118 the utility requirement demands
the invention be useful, while the disclosure requirement
demands that the written description of the invention enable
one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention.119 The inoperative embodiment rejection, like the undue breadth rejection, suffered from misguided reasoning
and inherent ambiguity. The demise of both rejections was
the genesis of the modern undue experimentation inquiry.

of section 112. See generally id. Such rejections are now controlled by new
M.P.E.P. § 706.03(c), entitled “Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, First Paragraph.”
Such rejections are discussed at length in M.P.E.P. Chapter 2100. See generally id.
§ 2164 (reiterating the principles and grounds formerly found in sections
706.03(n),(z)).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
116. See, e.g., In re Frilette, 423 F.2d 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that the first
paragraph of section 112 requires “enabling” disclosure).
117. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
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1. Utility and Disclosure of Utility
As explained above in Part I, the subject of an application
for a utility patent must be useful.120 While the utility requirement is found in section 101, it is also embraced by section 112.121 Indeed, the C.C.P.A. has held that compliance
with section 112 contemplates satisfaction of section 101.122
Furthermore, in Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,123 the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirming a lower court’s
holding that a patent application was invalid for lack of utility, confirmed that a rejection for lack of utility can properly
be made under either section 101 or section 112.124
Nonetheless, the requirements of these two sections are

120. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
121. See generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2107(d).
122. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967). In Kirk, the court explained:
[S]urely Congress intended [section] 112 to pre-suppose full satisfaction
of the requirements of [section] 101. Necessarily, compliance with [section] 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inventions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach
how to use a useless invention.
Id. at 942 (emphasis in original).
123. 724 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
124. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 956. In Raytheon, the court noted that:
Because it is for the invention as claimed that enablement must exist,
and because the impossible cannot be enabled, a claim containing a
limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under [section] 112.
Moreover, when a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unattainable result, the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as
claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either [section] 101 or
[section] 112 . . . .
Id.; see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07 (“Relationship of Enablement Requirement to Utility Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101”), § 2107.02 (“Special Considerations for Asserted Therapeutic or Pharmacologic Utilities”); U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERING DISCLOSURES OF UTILITY IN DRUG
CASES 567 (1968) [hereinafter PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES] (providing a historical discussion of disclosure in chemical cases); cf. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995). If an applicant
has not stated a utility, and the claimed invention does not have a well established utility, examiners should interpose a rejection under both sections 101 and
112. Id. at 36,264. This should shift the burden to the applicant to: (1) identify a
utility, and (2) show support for that utility in the specification. Id.
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distinct. The C.C.P.A. has admonished that “‘utility’ as required by section 101 and a showing of ‘how to use’ the invention as required by the first paragraph of section 112
should not be confused as has often been done by courts, including this court in In re Bremner . . . .”125 Such confusion
occasionally results in sufficiency of disclosure rejections
based upon the utility requirement of section 112.126
The C.C.P.A. examined the distinction between section
101 and section 112 in considerable detail in In re Nelson.127
The Nelson court noted that the utility requirement of section
101 is intended to limit the grant of patents to “useful” inventions.128 As such, section 101 limits the granting of patents to certain classes of invention—that is, those possessing
utility. It is therefore inappropriate to rely upon section 112
to object to the kind of utility disclosed.129 If the invention
possesses utility and the subject matter otherwise comes
within the classes of patentable subject matter, the invention
complies with section 101.130 Thus, “section 112, as we view
the matter, does not deal with ‘utility,’ in the sense in which
that term is used in patent law to define a prerequisite to
patentability.”131

125. In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277, 284 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (citing In re Bremner,
182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950)); cf. In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A.
1971). As the Fouche court observed:
It appears that the examiner and the board doubted that compositions
having heterocyclic moieties would be useful at all for therapeutic purposes. While this position could have led to a rejection under [section]
101, it also leads to a rejection under the how-to-use provision of [section] 112, since if such compositions are in fact useless, appellant’s
specification cannot have taught how to use them.)
Id.
126. See, e.g., Parker & Wasson v. Biel, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 613 (Bd. Pat. App.
& Int. 1961); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07.
127. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled on other grounds by
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
128. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 178.
129. Id. at 177.
130. Id. at 178.
131. Id.
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2. The Written Description Requirement
The call for a written description has been interpreted as
fulfilling a dual purpose in the unpredictable arts.132 Regardless of discipline, the requirement is first a modifier explaining how the disclosure shall be effected.133 Where the
invention is rooted in the unpredictable arts, the written description has additionally been interpreted as a separate requirement by which the applicant demonstrates an appreciation for the utility and breadth of the invention.134 Thus, the
written description is an independent, and occasionally dispositive, requirement.135 As a dispositive issue, however, it
is rarely raised outside the unpredictable arts.136
The written description is the mechanism whereby the
applicant establishes that he or she was in possession of the
invention at the time of filing. That is, the application, taken
together with the prior art, should explicitly document the
132. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1561.
135. In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 864 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also In re Barker, 559
F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
136. Cf. Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Markey, Chief J., dissenting). In Barker, the
court sustained a section 112 written description rejection in an uncomplicated
mechanical case. See generally In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). Judge Markey disagreed with the imposition of this
“separate description requirement” in such cases. Id. at 594 Nonetheless, he acknowledged the propriety of such a separate description requirement in complex
chemical cases. Id.
Unlike mechanical inventions, a description of a new composition of matter
does not necessarily carry with it a description of how to make or how to use the
invention, or its reasonable equivalents. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970). When this is so, it is incumbent upon applicant to show that he
or she was in possession of the invention at the time of filing by demonstrating
an appreciation for the utility and breadth of the invention as now claimed. See
In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184-85 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
As a practical matter, however, the written description requirement cannot
be wholly divorced from the enablement and how-to-use requirements, for if
they are not met, surely the written description requirement is not met. Thus,
reliance on the call for a written description as a separate requirement should be
made sparingly.
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utility of the invention, how to make and use the invention,
and the contemplated breadth of the invention.137
Courts have held that an applicant can satisfy the enablement and how-to-use requirements, yet fail to comply
with the written description requirement.138 This is further
confirmation that the written description requirement is distinct from the enablement or how-to-use requirements.139
The issue of compliance with a separate written description requirement might arise through the practice of amending claims during the course of prosecuting a patent application.140 By way of such amendments, an applicant redefines
the invention; in so doing, the applicant might fortuitously
teach how to use the invention and enable its use, without actually disclosing that particular invention in the original application.141 In other words, the addition of the limitation
within the claim might enable the claimed invention, and the
pre-existing disclosure might have taught how to use the invention, but the new limitation, if unsupported by the writ137. In a mechanism that is beyond the scope of this Article, applicants may
alternatively fulfill the “written description” requirement in the case of biological
materials by making a deposit of the material in a recognized depository. See
generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2402.
138. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561-62 (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008,
1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Barker,
559 F.2d at 591; In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is possible for a specification to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is
claimed, and still not describe that invention.”) (emphasis in original).
139. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563. In Vas-Cath, the Federal Circuit concluded
that:
The purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement is broader than to
merely explain how to ‘make and use’; the applicant must also convey
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention
is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now
claimed.
Id. at 1563-64.
140. See, e.g., In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In re
Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
141. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”).
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ten description of the specification as filed, might not have
been appreciated as material to a description necessarily circumscribing the invention.142
When the original disclosure lacks supporting disclosure
that is material to the disclosure of the invention, such
amendments constitute an impermissible attempt to introduce new matter to the application.143 This issue typically
arises where a particular feature is subsequently recognized
as imparting a distinct patentable advantage, or is necessary
to overcome a prior art reference or other barrier to patentability. For example, an applicant might attempt to
amend a claim during examination (or reissue) of the application;144 alternatively, an applicant might claim the benefit
142. See generally Ex parte Grasselli, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393 (Pat. Bd. App. &
Inf. 1983), on request for rehearing, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 395 (Pat. Bd. App. & Inf.
1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpublished).
143. The introduction of new matter into a patent application is prohibited by
statute. 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251 (1994); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 706.03(o)
(governing rejections based upon “new matter”). A brief but informative description of the term and discussion of the prohibition is found in In re Oda:
‘New matter’ is a technical legal term in patent law—a term of art. Its
meaning has never been clearly defined for it cannot be. The term is on
a par with such terms as infringement, obviousness, priority, abandonment and the like which express ultimate legal conclusions and are in
the nature of labels attached to results after they have been reached by
processes of reasoning grounded on analyses of factual situations. In
other words, the statute gives us no help in determining what is or is
not ‘new matter.’ We have to decide on a case-by-case basis what
changes are prohibited as ‘new matter’ and what changes are not.
443 F.2d 1200, 1203 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.04[1]. As
this passage suggests, a determination of what constitutes new matter is a complex and fact specific endeavor. See id. While a detailed treatment of the subject
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is helpful to recall the public policy objectives underlying disclosure. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. The
type of new matter that is proscribed by the Patent Act is that which is not otherwise available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251. That
is, if the subject matter sought to be introduced to the application is such that it
would not have been readily available from the prior art nor obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art over the teaching of the specification taken together with
the prior art, it is likely to be found to be new matter. See id. Viewed from this
perspective, new matter is the inverse of enablement. See infra part II.B.2.b (discussing enablement more fully).
144. See, e.g., In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (finding that
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of the earlier filing date of a related application145 when, in
fact, the applicant introduced in a later-filed application a
written description of the invention that he or she now
claims.146 This later scenario might arise when an applicant
claims the benefit of an earlier priority date in the U.S. counterpart of a foreign filed application, or in a domestic continuation-in-part application.147
Because of the benefits and advantages conferred on an
applicant as of the filing date of the application,148 courts and
the PTO measure enablement as of the filing date and strictly
prohibit applicants from later introducing into the application new matter that is material to the invention.149
3. Enabling One to Make and Use the Invention
Beyond the formal requirement of a written description,
an applicant’s disclosure must enable one of ordinary skill in
the art to make and use the invention.150 Although these two
facets of disclosure—enablement and how to make and use
the invention— are often addressed interchangeably, they
are distinct requirements.151 The two requirements are also
rightly, but sometimes confusingly, addressed when the utility of the invention is at issue.152 This sub-section first disdisclosure cannot be made sufficient while the application is pending by later
publications which enable the invention).
145. The related application may be filed under either sections 119 or 120.
146. See, e.g., Glass, 492 F.2d at 1232.
147. See, e.g., id.
148. See, e.g., id. (noting that the filing date becomes a date of constructive
reduction to practice).
149. See, e.g., id.; Oda, 443 F.2d at 1203-04; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251; 37
C.F.R. § 1.118 (1996); M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 608.04.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
151. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[5] (discussing the how-tomake requirement), § 7.03[6] (discussing the how-to-use requirement).
152. Id. at § 7.03[6]. As explained in the Chisum treatise:
There is a close relation between the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement under [s]ection 112 and the utility requirement under
[s]ection 101. If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not shown to be useful or operative, then it equally fails to
meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement.
Id.
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cusses the more particular how-to-make-and-use requirements, and second the more general enablement requirement.
a. The How-to-Make and How-to-Use
Requirements
The how-to-make requirement demands that the disclosure be sufficiently complete so as to teach one of ordinary
skill in the relevant art how to make the invention.153 The
requirement principally addresses the disclosure of essential
starting materials to ensure public availability consistent
with the objectives of the patent system.154
The issue of compliance with the how-to-use requirement
of section 112 often arises in the context of establishing an
appreciation for the utility of an invention.155 According to
the C.C.P.A., the test for compliance is what the application
communicates, implicitly and explicitly, to the skilled practitioner.156

153. See generally id. § 7.03[5].
154. Id. (suggesting that the application of the how-to-make requirement, in
the context of the unpredictable arts, principally addresses the need for the deposit of biological materials in a public depository as a means for complying
with the various requirements of the first paragraph of section 112). That subject
is outside the scope of this Article, and is not addressed further.
155. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
156. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 184-85. In Nelson, the court stated:
[T]he test is what the application as a whole communicates to one skilled
in the art. In some cases an applicant may, merely by naming his new
instrument or material, indicate what its use is, as, for example, by saying he has invented a ‘match,’ ‘hammer,’ ‘paint,’ ‘adhesive,’ or ‘detergent.’ He may or may not have to go further in order to enable others to
use the invention, depending on its nature and how much those of ordinary skill in the art know. In other words, compliance with the law
does not necessarily require specific recitations of use but may be inherent in description or may result from disclosure of a sufficient number
of properties to make a use obvious; and where those of ordinary skill
in the art will know how to use, the applicant has a right to rely on such
knowledge. If it will not be sufficient to enable them to use his invention, he must supply the know-how. As this court has often said before,
each case must be judged on its own facts.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Failure to disclose how to use the invention is an occasionally fatal infirmity in the unpredictable arts.157 In In re
Kirk,158 for example, the C.C.P.A. held that the applicants
had failed to disclose how to use their invention, by describing their invention merely as a new class of compounds often
possessing high biological activity.159 In substance, the court
agreed with the examiner that what the “applicants are
really saying to those in the art is take these steroids, experiment, and find what use they do have as medicines.”160
The examiner had refused to consider the applicants’ affidavit showing that three of the claimed compounds do, in fact,
possess specific anabolic, anti-inflammatory, or glucocorticoid activity, or usefulness as oral progestational agents.161
The court agreed, characterizing the affidavit as “simply an
ex post facto affirmation irrelevant to the issue of adequacy
of the original disclosure inasmuch as it attempts to add
statements of usefulness to the disclosure of the application
as filed.”162
Implicit in the Kirk court’s reasoning is the recognition
that the affidavit established that the claimed compounds
possessed utility.163 The claims were thus directed to patentable subject matter in compliance with section 101. The
157. See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
158. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
159. 376 F.2d at 938. In Kirk, the court explained:
It seems to us that the nebulous expressions ‘biological activity’ or ‘biological properties’ appearing in the specification convey no more explicit indication of the usefulness of the compounds and how to use
them than did the equally obscure expression ‘useful for [sic] technical
and pharmaceutical purposes’ unsuccessfully relied upon by the appellant in In re Diedrich.
Id. at 941 (citation omitted); cf. In re Johnson, 282 F.2d 370, 371 (C.C.P.A. 1960)
(satisfying the how-to-use requirement by stating “the products of the aforesaid
process are valuable as chemical intermediates for organic synthesis, for solvent
uses and for the preparation of toxic substances such as insecticides, fungicides, etc.”)
(emphasis added).
160. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 940.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 941.
163. See generally id. at 940-41.
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fatal infirmity, however, was the applicants’ failure to include the recitation of utility in the original disclosure.164
The proscription against adding new matter prevented the
applicants from entering the information into the disclosure
during examination.165 Thus, the application, as originally
filed, failed to teach how to use the invention.166 Notwithstanding, the Kirk court affirmed the examiner’s rejection of
the claims under both sections 101 and 112.167
Kirk perpetuated the confusion between Sections 101 and
112 that the Nelson court had attempted to eliminate.168 In
Nelson, the court built upon its own precedent, In re
Bremner,169 which, while eschewing any “hard and fast” rule
on disclosure of “utility” in a specification, held that the law
required “an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or
uses intended.”170 The Nelson court observed that Bremner had
already established that “applicants’ specification has to indicate the intended use or uses, which is a requirement distinct
from the mere possession of ‘utility.’”171
164. Id. at 941.
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.118 (1996); M.P.E.P., supra note
16, § 608.04.
166. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 940-41.
167. Id. at 941-42.
168. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183.
169. 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
170. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183 (quoting Bremner, 182 F.2d at 217) (emphasis in
original). The court clarified the precedential value of Bremner by explaining:
The first law point discussed in the Bremner opinion was that a patent
specification is required by law to assert ‘utility’ and the factual finding
was that it did not. We find on review of the record that the court was
mistaken in saying there was no assertion of utility, for the opening
statement of the Bremner et al. specification was that the invention was
‘new and useful.’ Upon reflection, we are now of the opinion that a mere
assertion of utility in a specification is a meaningless formality and no
more required by law than an assertion of novelty. We think it only
reasonable to infer from the fact of filing an application that the applicant asserts that the invention is new and useful, for unless it is both he
has no right to a patent.
Id. at 183 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
171. Id. But see M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07 (suggesting that section 101
requires that some use be set forth for the invention, and that the use be provable
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Nelson suggests that an invention either does or does not
inherently possesses utility under section 101,172 irrespective
of an applicant’s compliance with the disclosure requirement.173 It follows, then, that evidence of utility is entitled to
consideration at any time; it is not subject to the proscription
against the introduction of new matter.174 If, however, the
disclosure fails to describe, implicitly or explicitly, an appreciation for that utility and how to use the invention, the applicant has not complied with the first paragraph of section
112—an infirmity that cannot be corrected by an ex post facto
(or nunc pro tunc) affidavit, or any other evidence extrinsic to
the application.175
b. The Enablement Requirement
As with the how-to-make-and-use requirements, the
general enablement requirement has a utility component, in
that the applicant must supply others with the means or
knowledge necessary to successfully exploit the invention.176
This Article proposes that satisfaction of the enablement
requirement is properly addressed after confirming satisfaction of both the written description requirement and the
how-to-use requirement. For example, the invention might
possess utility (section 101); in addition, the applicant might
have correctly contemplated and expressed that utility (written description); finally, the applicant also might have deand not against public policy). Nelson characterizes the section 101 requirement
as satisfied by the mere possession of utility regardless what is “set forth.” See
Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183.
172. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183.
173. Id. at 184. In Nelson, the court acknowledged:
Much confused thinking on this matter has resulted from a failure to
separate the requirement of [s]ection 101 that an invention be useful
from the [s]ection 112 requirement that a specification shall so explain
‘the manner and process of . . . using’ the invention as to ‘enable any
person skilled in the art . . . to . . . use the same.’
Id.
174. See, e.g., id.
175. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941.
176. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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scribed the manner in which that utility can be exploited
(how-to-use). Nonetheless, the applicant must also supply
the means or knowledge necessary to actually exploit the
claimed invention in its entirety (enablement).177
i. Inoperative Embodiments
The utility/how-to-use/enablement conundrum comes
to the fore in rejections alleging that the claim embraces inoperative embodiments. Extension of the invention beyond
illustrated embodiments involves inductive reasoning.178
Extrapolating from demonstrated specifics, the inventor
proposes, explicitly or implicitly, a more general theory to
claim the invention broadly.179 These broader claims incorporate a generalization of the invention, or specify contemplated alternative functional components or features (what
the patent practitioner refers to as “equivalents”).180 Such extrapolation is a path riddled with pitfalls. The traditions of
scientific inquiry caution small, incremental steps,181 while
inventors occasionally urge large, inferential leaps.182
177. Cf. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736 (“Section 112 requires not that the specifications merely say how to use the claimed invention, but that such teaching be
true, i.e. in fact enabling.”).
178. See Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683-85 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
179. Id.
180. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043-45
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
181. Cf. REMINGTON’S PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES 8 (Alfonso R. Gennaro et al.
eds., 1985) (extolling the fundamentals of the scientific method seen in the writings and practices of Hippocrates and followers—that is, observation and classification, rejection of unsupported theory and superstition, and a cautious generalization and induction that remained open to critical discussion and revision).
182. See, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S.
465, 472 (1895). In addressing a charge of infringement against Edison for his use
of particular fibrous portions of bamboo plant in his new long lasting electric
light bulbs, the court stated (despite the complainant’s prior art patent teaching
the use of “fibrous” material but with only narrow exemplification):
Is the complainant entitled to a monopoly of all fibrous and textile materials for incandescent conductors? If the patentees had discovered in
fibrous and textile substances a quality common to them all, or to them
generally, as distinguishing them from other materials, such as minerals, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted them peculiarly to
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Inductive reasoning presents particular problems in the
unpredictable arts.183 In predictable cases, equivalents—
alternative but functional features—can be envisioned a priori. Unpredictability is wrought by the inability to so envision such equivalents. Likewise, an applicant might be unable to draw an “obvious” equivalent from the prior art.184
One reason for this inability might be that there is less art
from which to draw; alternatively, the applicant might be
unable to draw an obvious equivalent because the teachings
of the relevant art are inapplicable to the peculiarities of the
present invention.
Claims resulting from inductive reasoning in the unpredictable arts raise the possibility that the invention does not
incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad. . . . Sawyer
and Man supposed they had discovered in carbonized paper the best
material for an incandescent conductor. Instead of confining themselves to carbonized paper, as they might properly have done, and in
fact did in their third claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous
or textile material, when in fact an examination of over 6,000 vegetable
growths showed that none of them possessed the peculiar qualities that
fitted them for that purpose. Was everybody, then, precluded by this
broad claim from making further investigation? We think not.
Id. at 472; see, e.g., Todaro, supra note 13, at 37 (“Applicants in the field of biotechnology often seek claims that are undeniably broad in the light of the specification.”).
183. Cf. CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[4][d] (“A recurring problem is whether
a specification that sets forth a single or a limited number of examples can be
enabling of broad claims when the subject matter concerns biological materials
or reactions, which are generally considered to be unpredictable.”).
184. See Charles L. Gholz, Recent Developments in the C.C.P.A. Relating to the
First Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Conclusion), 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 1, 4 (1973).
According to one commentator:
It should be noted that ‘obvious’ in the [section] 112 sense does not
mean the same things as ‘obvious’ in the [section] 103 sense. While the
authorities are not uniform, the majority view appears to be that the
‘person skilled in the art’ referred to in . . . [section] 112 is not presumed
to know all the obscure, arcane art presumed to be known by [section]
103’s ‘person having ordinary skill in the art.’
Id. at 20 n.152 (citation omitted). But see CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[2](a), (b)
(“Although few decisions consider the question explicitly, it would seem that the
‘person skilled in the art” within the meaning of section 112 is the same as the
person having “ordinary skill in the art’ within the meaning of Section 103 on
nonobviousness.”).
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possess the utility alleged throughout the claimed scope.185
In the past, this possibility resulted in enablement rejections
alleging that the claims would be expected to embrace inoperative embodiments.186 As explained below, however, the
proper inquiry is twofold. The first question is whether the
invention possesses the specified utility throughout the
scope of the claim, regardless of whether there are inoperative embodiments within that scope. The second question is
whether one of ordinary skill in the relevant art could exploit that utility throughout the scope of the claim on the
strength of the applicant’s disclosure.
ii. Constructively Inoperative, Actually
Inoperative, and the Burden of Proof
Claims have suffered enablement rejections for being either constructively or actually possessed of inoperative embodiments.187 Those rejections would arise, for example,
when an applicant claims that an invention has a particular
range of application without presenting confirming data. To
avoid granting broad exclusivity on the basis of unsupported statements, the PTO might challenge the application’s enablement by alleging that the claims would be expected to embrace inoperative embodiments. To do so
successfully, the PTO must either show that the supporting
185. See generally Herbert H. Goodman, The Invalidation of Generic Claims for
Inclusion of a Small Number of Inoperative Species, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 745 (1958)
(outlining some of the “unique problems” arising in drafting chemical claims involving inductive reasoning from limited examples).
186. Id.; see also Gholz, supra note 184 (addressing clarification in the “BroadEnough-to-Read-on-Inoperative-Subject-Matter-Rejections); H. Einhorn, The Enforceability of Patent Claims Encompassing Some Inoperative Species, 45 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 716 (1963).
187. This Article uses the term, constructively inoperative, in reference to
claims which could be construed as embracing inoperative embodiments, but
which such embodiments would not be selected by one of ordinary skill in the
art because it would be apparent, a priori, that such embodiments would be inoperative; use of “actually inoperative” refers to claims embracing inoperative
embodiments but where it is not possible to discern which embodiments will be
inoperative, a priori. The significance of the distinction is discussed further below.
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statements are inaccurate, or explain why the written description does not enable the invention throughout the scope
of the claim.188
Before the C.C.P.A. had definitively resolved this issue,
one commentator suggested that the likelihood of success of
a challenge to the validity of a patent on the grounds of inclusion of inoperative embodiments in an infringement context was a function of equity.189 In other words, the commentator posited that courts would strive to preclude an
accused infringer from successfully asserting an inoperativeembodiments challenge when the infringer was exploiting
the invention consistent with the plain teaching of the patent.190
Another commentator noted that “[t]he inventor gains
nothing, nor is the public foreclosed, by claiming ‘more than
the invention’ where the ‘more’ is inoperative subject matter.”191 Nonetheless, the commentator conceded that a claim
including inoperative-embodiments might properly be held
invalid “where most of the embodiments are inoperative, or
where it is impossible or very difficult for one skilled in the
art to determine whether a material is operative.”192
In a span of two years, the C.C.P.A. decided four logi188. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is incumbent
upon the Patent Office, whenever a rejection on this basis [scope of enablement
commensurate with scope of protection sought] is made, to explain why it doubts
the truth or accuracy of any statement in a supporting disclosure. . . .”); accord
Bowen, 492 F.2d at 862 (“It is clear that even in cases involving the unpredictable
world of chemistry such reasons are required.”); Ex parte Gastambide, 189
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643, 645 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1975) (“Proper grounds for rejection require more than unsubstantiated doubt as to the operability of the invention.”); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PRECEDENT
GOVERNING THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT ¶ II.C (1995) [hereinafter PTO LEGAL
OVERVIEW: UTILITY]).
189. See generally Einhorn, supra note 186.
190. See generally id.
191. Goodman, supra note 185, at 749.
192. Id; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S.
271, 276-77 (1949) (holding that claims may be too broad “to the point of invalidity” by reason of reading on significant numbers of inoperative embodiments).
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cally-connected cases that together confirm that neither the
potential nor the actual existence of inoperative embodiments necessarily defeats a claim:193 (1) In re Skrivan,194 (2) In
re Cook,195 (3) In re Marzocchi,196 and (4) In re Fouche.197
In the first decision, In re Skrivan, the C.C.P.A. addressed
constructively inoperative embodiments. The applicant had
claimed certain improvements in the “plasma-jet” process
for making finely-divided metal oxides for use in pigments.198 The PTO had rejected several of the claims under
section 112 as being “unduly broad” in failing to include a
limitation alleged to be necessary to operation of the process.199 The examiner’s undue breadth rejection was predicated on the applicant’s failure to recite within the claim the
angle at which the two reactant-containing streams were
combined.200 The Skrivan court observed that neither were
the claims indefinite, nor had the applicant suggested that
the claims defined anything other than what the applicant
regarded as his invention.201 Moreover, the Skrivan court
193. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970). In Cook, the court observed:
While we have held that ‘the mere possibility of inclusion of inoperative . . . [subject matter] does not prevent allowance of broad claims,’
when the examiner sets forth reasonable grounds in support of his conclusion that an applicant’s claims may read on inoperative subject matter (other than subject matter inoperative only in the sense of In re
Skrivan) . . . it becomes incumbent upon the applicant either to reasonably limit his claims to the approximate area where operativeness has
not been challenged or to rebut the examiner’s challenge either by the
submission of representative evidence, or by persuasive arguments
based on known laws of physics and chemistry . . . .
439 F.2d at 734-35 n.4 (citations omitted); see also In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A.
1971); In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220
(C.C.P.A. 1971); see generally Gholz, supra note 184.
194. 427 F.2d 801 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
195. 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
196. 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
197. 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
198. Skrivan, 427 F.2d at 802.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 805.
201. Id. at 805-06.
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emphasized that the disputed limitation dealt with a routine
operating condition of an admittedly old aspect of the process.202 Such limitations, the court held, must be presumed to
be within the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art.203
In short, the Skrivan court held that claims that might be
construed as including inoperative embodiments are not
necessarily unpatentable.204 If it would have been obvious to
one skilled in the relevant art that the embodiments otherwise allowed by the claim would be inoperable, one skilled
in the art would not resort to such embodiments, and the
presence of such embodiments should not preclude allowability of the claim.205
Similarly, the C.C.P.A. has held that where such an ambiguity is not central to the invention, there is likewise little
risk of encroachment on the public interest, and the claims
may be allowed.206
The C.C.P.A. elaborated on Skrivan in In re Cook. The
claims in Cook, directed to zoom lens assemblies, stood rejected under the first paragraph of section 112. Among other
things, the claims were supported by six exemplary embodiments. The Cook court acknowledged that the optical
design of such lens assemblies is extremely complex, involving the manipulation of more than 100 related variables.207
The Cook court acknowledged that the PTO may reject claims
merely because they read on “one or more inoperative species,”208 but noted that many properly patented claims do
202. Id. at 806.
203. Skrivan, 427 F.2d at 806 (“We hold that claims need not recite such factors where one of ordinary skill in the art, to whom the specification and claims
are directed, would consider them obvious.”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., In re Stephens, 529 F.2d 1343, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“Noncritical features of the invention may be supported by a more general disclosure than
those at the heart of the invention.”).
207. Cook, 439 F.2d at 731.
208. Id. at 734 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336
U.S. 271, 276-77 (1949)).
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not exclude inoperative embodiments, because one skilled in
the relevant art might reasonably be presumed to appreciate
those factors that would lead to inoperative embodiments.209
Notwithstanding its recognition that inoperative embodiments do not necessarily preclude patentability of
claims, the court affirmed the PTO’s rejection of Cook’s
claims.210 The court characterized the examiner’s rejection
for insufficient disclosure under section 112 as twofold: (1)
because it would take one skilled in the art many months to
209. In Cook, the court explained:
We see no reason why the Patent Office and the courts deciding infringement litigation should not ‘have authority to reject a broad claim
merely because it . . . [reads on a significant number of] inoperative species.’
However, many patented claims read on vast numbers of inoperative embodiments in the trivial sense that they can and do omit ‘factors
which must be presumed to be within the level of ordinary skill in the
art,’ and therefore read on embodiments in which such factors may be
included in such a manner as to make the embodiments inoperative.
There is nothing wrong with this so long as it would be obvious to one
of skill in the relevant art how to include those factors in such manner
as to make the embodiment operative rather than inoperative.
Id. at 734-35 (alternation in original) (citations omitted); accord In re Geerdes, 491
F.2d 1260, 1265 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“Of course, it is possible to argue that process
claims encompass inoperative embodiments on the premise of unrealistic or
vague assumptions, but that is not a valid basis for rejection.”); In re Smythe, 480
F.2d 1376 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In Smythe, the court noted that:
The use here of any particular ‘liquids’ which would be inoperative,
such as the examples given by the board—‘colored materials,’ materials
‘adherent to the walls of the sight tube,’ and ‘liquid wetting agents’—
would be predictably inoperative in the invention and thus would
never be selected by one skilled in the art. As we have said before, it is
almost always possible to so construe a claim as to have it read on inoperative embodiments, but the alternative of requiring an applicant to be
so specific in his claims “as to exclude materials known to be inoperative and [which] even those not skilled in the art would not try” would
result in claims which would fail to comply with [section] 112, second
paragraph, because they would be so detailed as to obscure, rather than
to particularly point out and distinctly claim, the invention.
480 F.2d at 1385 (citations omitted); see also Ex parte Vollheim, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 407, 408 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1975) (“It is not a function of the claims to
specifically exclude either possible inoperative conditions or ineffective reactant
proportions.”).
210. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736 (holding that the PTO had properly rejected the
claims).
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design other lenses that came within the claim, and (2) because the six examples were not representative of the ranges
recited in the claims.211 Under the examiner’s first rationale,
the Cook court found for the applicants.212 Although the applicants conceded that the claims encompassed a large number of inoperative embodiments, the court found that a person skilled in the relevant art could determine a priori, albeit
through lengthy calculations, which embodiments would be
inoperative.213
Under the examiner’s second rationale, however, the
Cook court ruled against the applicants.214 The court held
that the applicants had represented, at least implicitly
through their application, that operative embodiments resided throughout the claimed ranges, but that the corresponding ranges found in the examples were not coextensive
with the claimed ranges.215 The court found that, when challenged on this point by the PTO, the applicants failed to provide evidence supporting the recited ranges,216 and accordingly affirmed the examiner’s rejection.217
The court held that although one skilled in the relevant
art would have known a priori that certain embodiments
within the claimed ranges of variables would be inoperative,
the applicants failed to show that embodiments could be
made throughout the claimed ranges that would be operative.218 The court further held that the conceded existence of
211. Id. at 732.
212. Id. at 732-33.
213. Id. at 735; see also Tyler v. City of Boston, 74 U.S. 327, 330 (1868) (observing that the effects of a machine consisting of a combination of devices and subject of invention, may be calculated a priori, while discovery of a new substance
by means of chemical combinations of known materials is empirical and discovered by experiment).
214. Cook, 439 F.2d at 735-36.
215. Id.
216. Id. Finally, on appeal, the applicants made the unsupported statement
that they had performed calculations supporting the ranges. Id. at 736.
217. Id.
218. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736.
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inoperative embodiments—which the PTO and the court
treated as analogous to unpredictability—supported the examiner’s challenge, and shifted the burden of proof to the
applicants to establish the existence of operative embodiments throughout the ranges claimed.219
In In re Marzocchi, the C.C.P.A. further refined the proper
allocation of the burden of proof, particularly in the context
of a chemical case. In Marzocchi, the applicants had claimed
a technique for improving the adhesion characteristics between glass fibers and vinyl polymer resins by premixing a
specified “amine compound” with the polymer resin.220
Claims six and twelve, which specified “polyethyleneamine”
as the amine compound, were rejected under the first paragraph of section 112 as not enabled by the specification.221
The PTO noted that “[t]he term is obviously generic to a considerable number of compounds.”222 The Marzocchi court
reversed the rejection, explaining that the PTO had expressed nothing more than concern over the breadth of the
disputed term.223 The court held that if the specification
supports the claim, and there is no reason to doubt the supporting statements made in the specification, the disclosure
must be taken as enabling;224 that is, where the specification
supports the scope of the claim ab initio, it is incumbent upon
the PTO to disprove or explain why it doubts the truth or accuracy of the supporting statements in the specification.225
219. See id. (noting that “[a]ppellants asserted that they had ‘made calculations which resulted in the definition of the ranges set forth in the specification,’
but they never produced those calculations to substantiate the truthfulness of the
teaching in their specification which the examiner challenged.”).
220. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 221.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 223.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24. The Marzocchi court noted that:
In the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the wellknown unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to
create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim. This will especially
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The applicants in Marzocchi had complied with the written description requirement by expressly contemplating a
certain breadth of the invention, constraining the PTO to put
forth credible reasons to rebut such statements.226 Because
the PTO had merely expressed doubt about enablement due
to the apparent breadth of the term, it failed to meet its burden, and the court reversed the rejection.227
be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific principles. Most often, additional factors, such as the
teachings in pertinent references, will be available to substantiate any
doubts that the asserted scope of objective enablement is in fact commensurate with the scope of protection sought and to support any demands based thereon for proof. In any event, it is incumbent upon the
Patent Office, whenever a rejection on this basis is made, to explain why
it doubts the truth or accuracy of any statement in a supporting disclosure and to back up assertions of its own with acceptable evidence or
reasoning which is inconsistent with the contested statement.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Ex parte Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1822
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988). According to the Hitzeman court: “[w]e are mindful
that it is incumbent on the PTO, whenever a rejection on this basis is made, to
advance acceptable reasoning or evidence which is inconsistent with enablement. That is, it is incumbent on the examiner to first establish a prima facie case
of nonenablement.” Id. (citations omitted).
226. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224.
227. Id.; see also In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588, 589-90 (C.C.P.A. 1971). In Barr, the
examiner had rejected claims incorporating the terms “5-pyrazolone coupler
radical” and “open-chain ketomethylene coupler radical,” among others. Id. The
applicants had filed a lengthy specification including working examples for 25
different 5-pyrazolone coupler radicals. Id. at 595. Consistent with usage in the
claims, the applicants had used the terms generically within the specification,
and thus complied with the written description requirement. Id.
The court faulted both the Board and the examiner for failing to identify particular deficiencies whereby the working examples were inadequate to support
the claimed genus. Id. at 596. The court noted that the PTO proffered no evidence of inoperative compounds within the scope of the claims, nor was there
any evidence suggesting that “any significant group of compounds embraced by
the claims are so obviously inoperative that we can take judicial notice of the
fact.” Barr, 444 F.2d at 589-90. In reversing, the Barr court said:
Appellants have specifically disclosed how to make and use a large
number of compounds and have asserted that other compounds, similar
to the compounds specifically disclosed in certain stated respects, may
be made and used in the same fashion. We see no reason, on the state
of this record, to suspect that their assertion is not accurate or that appellants are not the pioneer inventors they claim to be. Appellants’ application runs to 132 pages in the transcript of record, and we are not
persuaded that any useful purpose would have been served by extend-
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In In re Fouche, however, the PTO met its burden. The
applicant had presented claims directed to dibenzocycloheptadiene derivatives said to be useful for antidepressant, neuroleptic, and tranquilizing properties.228 The PTO rejected a
generic claim incorporating a Markush group,229 which expressly included both aliphatic and heterocyclic230 substituents, under the first paragraph of section 112 for insufficiency of disclosure.231 In rejecting the claim, the examiner
urged that the specification did not enable the use of compounds having heterocyclic moieties.232 The examiner noted
that none of the working examples included heterocyclic
moieties, and concluded that one of skill in the relevant art
would not expect such embodiments to be operative.233
The court acknowledged that the specification was devoid of examples incorporating heterocyclic moieties, and
that the applicant failed to provide other evidence supporting the utility of such compounds.234 Furthermore, the court
ing it with further working examples.
Id. at 596-97.
228. Id. at 1238.
229. A Markush group is a “contrived generic expression where no true generic expression exists. Example: a metal selected from the group consisting of
copper, silver, and gold.” LANDIS, supra note 52, at 528; see also Edward C. Walterscheid, Markush Practice Revisited, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 270 (1979).
230. Aliphatic refers to organic compounds characterized by straight or
branched chain arrangement of the constituent carbon atoms; heterocyclic refers
to closed ring chemical substituents having a hetero atom, such as nitrogen or
oxygen, integral to the closed ring. See N. IRVING SAX AND RICHARD J. LEWIS, SR.,
HAWLEY’S CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY (11th ed. 1987). Here, the terms are
used to describe substituents attached to the molecular skeleton of the core
pharmacological compound.
231. Fouche, 439 F.2d at 1243.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. The court stated that:
[T]he inclusion of representative examples is not required to
enable a person skilled in the art to use a generic invention.
Nevertheless, an applicant must use some technique of providing teaching of how to use which is commensurate with the
breadth of protection sought by the claim, unless such knowledge is already available to persons skilled in the art.
Id. (emphasis added).
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relied on the fact that the PTO had cited a reference that
called into question the utility of the claimed compounds
when bearing heterocyclic substituents.235 The court said
that reference was sufficient to shift the burden to the appellant, and thus affirmed the rejection.236
C. Undue Experimentation
The modern enablement inquiry has supplanted the undue breadth and inoperative embodiments rejections.237 The
PTO and judicial opinions now focus on whether one skilled
in the art would expect that undue experimentation would
be required to practice the invention throughout its scope; in
other words, whether the scope of enablement is commensurate in scope with the claim.238 The development of this inquiry was a significant step in the evolution of the sufficiency of disclosure analysis as applied to the unpredictable
arts.239 This section traces that development.
The evolution of the undue experimentation analysis began in 1970, when the C.C.P.A. contemporaneously found
fatal ambiguities in challenges based upon both undue
235. Fouche, 439 F.2d at 1243.
236. Id.
237. See supra parts II.A.1, II.B.2.b. As discussed above, the continued viability of the “undue breadth” rejection is questionable. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text. But cf. CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[7] (discussing undue
breadth generally). Professor Chisum refers to the “three senses of undue
breadth,” one of which is a claim encompassing material from the prior art. Id.
The source of such a rejection is novelty (section 102) and/or obviousness (section 103). Id. Consistent with the theme of this Article, use of “undue breadth”
does not include that aspect.
238. See In re Angstadt, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that
the PTO bears the initial burden of establishing why a specification is not enabling, and that alleged insufficiencies of disclosure necessitate undue experimentation). One commentator has suggested that there is a dichotomy between the
inquiries as to whether undue experimentation would be required or whether
the scope of enablement is commensurate with the scope of the claims. Walterscheid (pt. V), supra note 14. The inquiries suggest different tests requiring different evidence, and, presumably, capable of yielding different results. This Article treats the inquiries as stated in the text above as coterminous.
239. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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breadth and inoperative embodiments.240 Although both
terms subsequently faded from use, the underlying issue—
how to test the scope of enablement against the scope of protection sought—remains.241
The evolution that occurred during that era is seen in retrospect in In re Sichert.242 Sichert sounded the death knell for
challenges based upon inoperative embodiments,243 and confirmed the arrival of the modern inquiry.244

240. See, e.g., In re Barr, 422 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (undue breadth and inoperative embodiments); In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (inoperative
embodiments); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (concerning undue
breadth); see also In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring):
Beginning in 1970, we departed from a vast line of authority which
permitted the PTO to reject claims under the second paragraph of [section] 112 for ‘undue breadth.’ Up to that time, examiners quite frequently determined what they felt the invention was and rejected all
claims which were broader than their conception of the invention, using
the second paragraph of [section] 112 as the statutory basis. Most often,
the examiner’s conception of the invention was derived from a reading
of an applicant’s specification.
Id.
241. See e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
242. 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
243. Having seemingly disposed of inoperative embodiments as a valid basis for rejection, In re Sichert was the last C.C.P.A. opinion to substantively address the issue in those terms. But cf. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 497 F. Supp.
661, 682 (D. Del. 1980) (“The third description rule prevents an applicant’s claim
from covering inoperative as well as operative subject matter.”) (citing Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949)). The M.P.E.P.
continues to address the inoperative embodiments rejection. M.P.E.P., supra note
16, § 2164.08(b). Nonetheless, the PTO acknowledges that the rejection is often
obviated by functional language limiting the claim to operative embodiments.
244. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161. In Sichert, the court said:
[The rejection] establishes a prima facie case of lack of enablement, a
result that would not follow from a showing or allegation of the mere
possibility of inclusion of inoperative embodiments in broad claims.
Therefore, the burden shifted to appellant to show that one of ordinary
skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the Sichert court explicitly discounted the significance of inoperative embodiments within the ambit of the
claim in favor of an examination as to whether undue experimentation would be
required.
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The term undue experimentation is not new to the sufficiency of disclosure analysis.245 For example, in Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Wolf,246 the court addressed alleged infringement of patents pertaining to egg hatching.247 The defendant
urged that the method claims were void for indefiniteness.248
According to the alleged infringer, important features, such
as the temperature, humidity, and velocity of air current
within certain egg incubators, were not recited within the
specification.249 The alleged infringer further argued that the
absence of such features in the patent’s disclosure thereby
created a patent that was erroneous and misleading.250 The
Buckeye court observed, however, that despite the discovery
of certain defects in a commercialized prototype incubator,
various field experts sent out by the incubator company had
been able to remedy those defects.251 The court thus denied
the proposition that the patent was fatally flawed for omitting from the disclosure something known to be necessary to
the practice of the invention.252
Buckeye presaged the modern inquiry. Its reasoning and,
particularly, its use of the term undue (as opposed to other
modifiers) placed an emphasis on the qualitative aspect of

245. See generally Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Wolf, 291 F. 253 (N.D. Ohio
1923).
246. 291 F. at 253.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 261. At the time Buckeye was decided, the controlling law was the
Patent Act of 1870, Section 26 [R.S. § 4888]. That section corresponded to current
section 112, but it combined in a single paragraph the disclosure requirements of
the first paragraph of section 112 with the claim requirements of the second
paragraph of section 112. Understandably, the court treats indefiniteness interchangeably with the requirements of disclosure.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Buckeye, 291 F. at 261.
252. Id. The court rejected the proposition that the patentee had omitted
from his disclosures something that was known to be necessary to the practical
operation of his method claims. Id. In actual experience, persons skilled in the
art have not found these disclosures so indefinite and defective as to make the
apparatus inoperative without undue experimentation. Id.
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the experimentation required.253 Others had suggested that
the need for merely independent or extensive experimentation
should nullify patentability.254 Subsequent decisions have
acknowledged the propriety of that qualitative emphasis.255
In 1961, the term undue experimentation was resurrected.256 In Locklin v. Switzer Bros.,257 the patent in issue was
directed to resins useful in the manufacture of pigments.258
The resin ingredients were said to include an aldehyde, a
melamine, and a sulfonamide.259 The accused infringer challenged the sufficiency of the disclosure as inadequate to
support a claim for a broad class of melamine derivatives.260
Specifically, the alleged infringer claimed that “there is no
recipe given for the proportions of the entire class of melamine compounds by which one could be certain to obtain
the critical result.”261 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged
testimony that such a determination involved “a simple,
clear test for an ordinary chemist to perform and one that
does not require extensive experimentation in order that the
precise critical limits be ascertained in a particular case.”262
253. Id. at 261-62.
254. See, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S.
465, 474 (1895) (“If the description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell,
except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the
patent is void.”); Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. 1 (1847) (suggesting that any experimentation nullifies the patent).
255. Cf. In re Angstadt, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 219 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The
key word is ‘undue’ not ‘experimentation.’”).
256. Locklin v. Switzer Bros., 299 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1961).
257. 299 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1961).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 162.
260. Id. at 167.
261. Id.
262. Locklin, 299 F.2d at 166. Similarly, in Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde,
the Court said:
Equally untenable is the claim that the patent is invalid for the reason
that the evidence shows that when different ores are treated preliminary tests mus[t] be made to determine the amount of oil and the extent
of agitation necessary in order to obtain the best results. Such variation
of treatment must be within the scope of the claims, and the certainty
which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, hav-
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Thus, the court held that ascertaining such specific limits in
any particular case did not require extensive or undue experimentation.263
Subsequently, undue experimentation was invoked with
increasing frequency. Nonetheless, it was not until 1970 that
it rose to the level of a structured analytical tool.264

ing regard to their subject matter. The composition of ores varies infinitely, each one presenting its special problem, and it is obviously impossible to specify in a patent the precise treatment which would be
most successful and economical in each case. The process is one for
dealing with a large class of substances and the range of treatment
within the terms of the claims,while leaving something to the skill of
persons applying the invention, is clearly sufficiently definite to guide
those skilled in the art to its successful application, as the evidence
abundantly shows. This satisfies the law.
242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916) (citations omitted).
263. Locklin, 299 F.2d at 168.
264. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (identifying the direct
relationship between unpredictability and noting the likelihood that undue experimentation will be required). Previously, opinions had merely reiterated the
term “undue experimentation” from PTO rejections without explaining how such
a conclusion is properly made. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Chase Chem. Co.,
155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 139, 145 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“It is, of course, well settled, that a
patent is invalid for insufficient disclosure if, in order to practice the invention, a
person skilled in the art must resort to elaborate experimentation, independent
investigation, or exercise inventive skill.”) (citations omitted); In re Long, 368
F.2d 892, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“We are of the view that the minimum amount of
disilicide required to bind the oxide particles together can be determined by a
skilled metallurgist without an undue amount of experimentation.”); In re
Moureu, 345 F.2d 595, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“Appellants have not placed one iota
of evidence in the record to indicate that one skilled in the art would be able to
use their antitubercular compounds effectively without undue experimentation . . . [leaving us] no way of knowing whether an express ‘how to use’ disclosure is necessary.”); In re Corneil, 347 F.2d 557, 561 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“[Although
we] do not hold that actual performance of appellants’ method would necessarily be a prerequisite to patentability . . . the fact that the method has not been performed compels recognition that other problems not yet uncovered may exist in
addition to those discussed.”); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“From
the disclosure of appellant’s invention as it appears in the specification alone, we
feel that one skilled in the art would be enabled to make and use appellant’s invention without undue experimentation . . . .”); see also PTO DRUG UTILITY
GUIDELINES, supra note 124, at 568 (“It is not necessary to specify the dosage or
method of use if it is obvious to one skilled in the art that such information could
be obtained without undue experimentation.”) (emphasis added).
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In In re Fisher,265 the PTO Board of Appeals had rejected
for insufficient disclosure Fisher’s claims directed to adrenocorticotrophic hormones (“ACTH”) having “at least twentyfour amino acids” of a specified sequence.266 Fisher had disclosed only certain ACTHs having thirty-nine amino acids.267 The court concluded that this was insufficient to enable one skilled in the relevant art to make ACTHs of
anything other than thirty-nine amino acids; consequently,
the applicant had not enabled one of skill in the art to make
ACTHs of “at least twenty-four amino acids.”268
In re Angstadt269 illustrates the further transformation of
the enablement inquiry from its focus on inoperative embodiments to undue experimentation. In Angstadt, the
claimed invention involved a method of catalytically converting hydrocarbons to hydroperoxides.270 In example six
of the disclosure, however, the applicants stated that they
had recovered from that reaction mixture an aldehyde rather
than a hydroperoxide.271 The PTO rejected the corresponding claim based upon inoperative examples.272 The appellate
court reversed,273 acknowledging that “many chemical processes, and catalytic processes particularly, are unpredictable,
265. 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
266. Id. at 838-39.
267. Id. at 839.
268. Id. at 836. In Fisher, the court said:
[T]he parent specification does not enable one skilled in the art to make
or obtain ACTHs with other than 39 amino acids in the chain, and there
has been no showing that one of ordinary skill would have known how
to make or obtain such other ACTH’s without undue experimentation.
As for appellant’s conclusion that the 25th to 39th acids in the chain are
unnecessary, it is one thing to make such a statement when persons
skilled in the art are able to make or obtain ACTH having other than 39
amino acids; it is quite another thing when they are not able to do so.
Id.
269. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
270. Id. at 499. For definitions of chemical terminology, see SAX AND LEWIS,
supra note 74.
271. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501.
272. Id. at 500-01.
273. Id. at 505.
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and that the scope of enablement varies inversely with the
degree of unpredictability involved.”274 Nonetheless, in this
case, the applicants’ process is “not complicated and there is
no indication that special equipment or unusual reaction
conditions must be provided when practicing the invention.”275 The applicants had shown that the same metal salt
catalyst used in example six was operative, albeit with other
starting materials.276 The Angstadt court observed that it was
common in the use of catalysts to perform trial runs, even if
the end result was uncertain.277 The court noted that the
burden was on the PTO to give reasons why the specification is not enabling, and that a showing that the alleged insufficiencies of the disclosure necessitate undue experimentation is part of the PTO’s initial burden.278 Other than the
applicants’ failure to successfully identify hydroperoxides in
the product of example six, the PTO had failed to explain
why it doubted the truth or accuracy of the supporting disclosure.279
Angstadt is analogous to the court’s treatment of the
PTO’s rejection in Cook. In Cook, the court observed that it
would have been possible for one of skill in the relevant art
to determine, a priori, which variables would lead to inoperative embodiments, albeit through complex and lengthy calculations.280 Similarly, in Angstadt, the court concluded that
it would have been routine to conduct trial runs to determine which of the catalyst/starting material combinations
would be operative.281 That is, although the determination
274. Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
275. Id. at 503.
276. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504-05.
277. Id. at 504 (noting that some experimentation is acceptable and that the
term “experimentation” implies that the success of the activity is uncertain).
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1975)); see also In re
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
280. Cook, 439 F.2d at 730.
281. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 505 (“In this art the performing of trial runs using
different catalysts is ‘reasonable,’ even if the end result is uncertain . . . .”).
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could not be made, a priori, such routine trial runs were no
more burdensome than complex and lengthy calculations as
required in Cook.282 Accordingly, the Angstadt court reversed
the PTO’s rejection.283
1. Undue Experimentation and its Subsidiary
Factors
Just months before Sichert, the C.C.P.A. decided In re
Colianni,284 in which Judge Miller’s concurring opinion expressed collectively the various factors to be included in an
undue experimentation inquiry where unpredictable factors
pertain.285 Judge Miller suggested that one should consider:
(1) whether the applicant has provided sufficient direction or
guidance for any experimentation, and (2) the presence or
absence of working examples, (3) the nature of the invention,
(4) the state of the prior art, (5) the relative skill of those in
the art, (6) the unpredictability of the art, and (7) the breadth
of the claims.286 The Federal Circuit, the C.C.P.A., and the
282. Cf. Tyler v. City of Boston, 74 U.S. 327, 330 (1868).
283. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 505.
284. 561 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
285. Id. at 224 (Miller, J., concurring).
286. Id. Judge Miller wrote:
In determining what constitutes undue experimentation, many factors
are to be taken into account. The quality of any necessary experimentation would clearly be undue when ‘ingenuity beyond that to be expected of one of ordinary skill in the art’ is required. Judge Rich’s opinion indicates that the quantity of necessary experimentation (i.e., ‘a
great amount of work’) may be undue. However, an extended period
of experimentation may not be undue if the skilled artisan is given sufficient direction or guidance. Other factors to be considered are the
presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention,
the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and the breadth of the claims.
Id. (citations omitted). The qualitative aspect of any necessary experimentation
had been acknowledged earlier. See Matheson v. Campbell, 78 F. 910 (2d Cir.
1897). In Matheson, the court found insufficient disclosure in support of claims
generically covering the diazotization of sulpho acids derived from coal tar to
create aniline colors, notably naphthol-black. Id. at 916. The applicants conceded
that there were as many as 500 such sulpho acids and that a great many of these
would not work in the prescribed process. Id. The court concluded that “[s]ome
future experimenter will have to make some new discovery, and invent some
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PTO have embraced Judge Miller’s factors (and others)
when analyzing sufficiency of disclosure in disciplines perceived to be possessed of unpredictability.287
Ironically, Judge Miller had dissented in Angstadt, yet in
Colianni he provides an artfully crafted statement that brings
Angstadt in line with Cook. The majority in Angstadt held
that the performance of trial runs was commonplace and
thus reasonable.288 Angstadt is thus an extension of Cook in
that the majority was not dissuaded by the fact that one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had to perform
trial runs of the claimed process to determine operability.
One can see from the court’s reasoning that it concluded that
such trial runs did not require “ingenuity beyond that to be
expected of one of ordinary skill in the art.”289
The determination of what constitutes undue experimentation must be decided on the facts of each particular case;
such a determination also “requires the application of a
new process, before these other sulpho acids can be transformed into naphtholblack.” Id.
287. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (identifying factors to be considered in the undue experimentation inquiry as: (1) the quantity
of experimentation necessarily; (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented; (3) the presence or absence of working examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7)
the predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the breadth of the claims);
Ex parte Kung, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1547 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990) (identifying as undue experimentation factors: (1) the breadth of the claims; (2) the nature of the invention; (3) the amount of direction or guidance presented; (4) the
presence or absence of working examples; and (5) the unpredictability of the art);
Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (Bd. Pat. App & Int. 1986); see also
In re Stephens, 529 F.2d 1343, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In Stephens, the court noted:
The test is whether there is sufficient working procedure for one skilled
in the art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In addition to the presence or absence of a working example, relevant considerations are the nature of the invention, the state of the prior
art, and the relative skill of those in that art.
Id. (citation omitted).
288. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504.
289. 537 F.2d 503; see also Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916);
Buckeye Incubator, Inc. v. Wolf, 291 F. 253 (N.D. Ohio 1923); In re Gay 309 F.2d
769 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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standard of reasonableness, having due regard for the nature
of the invention and the state of the art.”290 It is well established that a patent specification need not be a blueprint for
practicing the invention.291 Accordingly, “enablement is not
precluded even if some experimentation is necessary, although the amount of experimentation must not be unduly
extensive.”292
Thus, some level of experimentation is to be tolerated, although apparently not so much that it rises to inventive experimentation, or that requiring ingenuity beyond one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Experimentation requiring
only routine optimization or screening is not inventive experimentation.293
2. Supporting the Generic Claim
As previously noted, the genus-species dichotomy has
been problematic for inventors, the PTO, and the courts, particularly when addressing inventions in disciplines per290. Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986).
291. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that patent specifications need not be as detailed as production specifications).
292. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has explained that:
The test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect
to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed to enable
the determination of how to practice a desired embodiment of the invention claimed.
Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 547.
293. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Enablement is
not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation such as routine screening.”) (citations omitted); Locklin, 299 F.2d at 166. The Locklin court stated:
There is testimony to the effect that ‘sufficient melamine to render the
resin substantially insoluble’ is a simple, clear test for an ordinary
chemist to perform and one which does not require extensive experimentation in order that the precise critical limits be ascertained in a particular case. Under such circumstances, the fact that some preliminary
testing is required does not render the claim invalid for vagueness.
Id. (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916)).
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ceived to be unpredictable.294 This sub-section focuses on
several cases illustrating failed attempts to support genus
claims with discrete species claims.
In Ex parte Diamond,295 the PTO Board of Appeals had
specifically held that an applicant shall not secure exclusive
rights to a broad generic invention on the basis of broad unsupported statements.296
In 1968, the Commissioner of Patents issued Guidelines
for Considering Disclosure of Utility in Drug Cases (“Guidelines”).297 With regard to establishing utility of genus claims,
the Guidelines clarified the rule from Ex parte Diamond, explaining that unsupported generalizations must be taken at
face value, unless there is some basis for doubting them.298
In Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,299 the court addressed the
sufficiency of disclosure of broad genus claims, and acknowledged the principle that the specification must support the utility of claimed compounds throughout the scope

294. See supra notes 55-90 (discussing application of the disclosure requirement to the unpredictable arts).
295. 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1959).
296. In Diamond, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences said:
An applicant may not preempt an unduly large field by the expedient of
making broad prophetic statements in the specification and claims
unless the accuracy of such statements is sufficiently supported by well
established chemical principles or by sufficient number of examples.
Id. at 168.
297. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERING
DISCLOSURES OF UTILITY IN DRUG CASES (1968).
298. The Guidelines stated that:
[R]epresentative examples together with a statement applicable to the
genus as a whole will ordinarily be sufficient if it would be deemed
likely by one skilled in the art, in view of contemporary knowledge in
the art, that the claimed genus would possess the asserted utility. Proof
of utility will be required for other members of the claimed genus only
in those cases where adequate reasons can be advanced by the examiner
for believing that the genus as a whole does not possess the asserted
utility.
PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 124, at 568; see also M.P.E.P., supra note
16, § 2107.02.
299. 497 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del. 1980).
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of the claim.300 In what the court loosely characterized as an
exception to this rule, it observed that only a few examples
will suffice where the claimed compounds share a “key
structural feature from which a common utility derives.”301
300. Id. at 681-82.
301. Id. at 682. The court suggests that there is an exception to the so-called
chemical exception, which brings the court’s reasoning back in line with the general rule. Id. The chemical exception states that, due to unpredictability, generic
claims involving chemical reactions can not be supported by a limited number of
examples. M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.03. Nonetheless, as among more predictable inventions, as where claimed compounds share key features having an
acknowledged common utility, the general rule should prevail—that is, a limited
number of examples can support broad generic claims. Here, the court found
that there was an acknowledged common utility, and so the unpredictability giving rise to the chemical exception did not pertain. Hercules, 497 F. Supp. at 682.
Further, one might interpret the court’s reasoning to suggest some quantifiable relationship between the number of examples and the requisite support for
a genus claim from which an exception might be made. The courts have routinely spurned the proposition that there is any such relationship to be divined.
See In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357,
360 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“The decisions do not however fix any definite number of
species which will establish completion of a generic invention and it seems evident therefrom that such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of
particular cases.”). In Strahilevitz, the court observed:
We recognize that working examples are desirable in complex technologies and that detailed examples can satisfy the statutory enablement requirement . . . . Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the board, examples
are not required to satisfy section 112, first paragraph. Therefore the examiner’s statement that the ‘nearly universal applicability’ alleged for
the invention necessitated numerous examples was erroneous.
Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also In re
Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 696 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (rejecting the board’s reasoning that
it was “well settled law that disclosure of a species is insufficient to provide descriptive support for a generic or sub-generic claim”); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d
904, 910 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]here is no magical relation between the number of
representative examples and the breadth of the claims; the number and variety
of examples are irrelevant if the disclosure is ‘enabling’ and sets forth the ‘best
mode contemplated.’”). But cf. In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949 (C.C.P.A. 1960). The
court in Grimme stated:
The question as to the sufficiency of disclosure to support a generic or
subgeneric claim in the field of chemistry has frequently been considered by this court and it has been consistently held that the naming of
one member of such a group is not, in itself, a proper basis for a claim to
the entire group. However, it may not be necessary to enumerate a plurality of species if a genus is sufficiently identified in an application by
‘other appropriate language.’ What constitutes ‘other appropriate language’ within the meaning of the cited cases will, of course, depend on
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Nonetheless, the Hercules court correctly emphasized that
the proper inquiry is whether there is a key feature common
to those members of the claimed genus and associated with
the utility alleged.302 Support for the presence of the feature,
or its association with the alleged utility, might be derived
from either the disclosure itself, or from the prior art generally.303 Thus, the inquiry is whether the applicant has relied
upon a generic feature that is truly common to the invention,
and whether that feature is recognized or shown to be associated with the invention either within the prior art or the
specification.304
The applicant in In re Sichert305 failed to establish the requisite nexus between the supposedly generic feature and the
alleged inventive utility. Although the applicant described
the therapeutic benefits of a drug obtained from plant extracts from various plant families,306 his disclosure failed to
establish that the drug could be extracted successfully from
even a single plant from each of the enumerated families.307
The Sichert court’s reasoning seized upon the applicant’s
reliance on general taxonomic principles to generalize the
invention; the court noted that those principles have no apparent relationship with the inventive utility, which, in this
case, was the presence of the drug.308 Accordingly, the Sithe circumstances of each particular case.
Id. at 952 (citations omitted); M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.02 (“Working Example”).
302. Hercules, 497 F. Supp. at 682.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
306. Id. at 1156.
307. Id. The C.C.P.A. quoted the board’s reasoning with approval:
We note that claim 1 recites families of plants as opposed to genuses.
The taxonomy of plants is not based on drug content but on leaf form,
flower type, etc. Thus, the family Solanaceae, for example, includes belladonna, petunia, hot pepper and sweet pepper. It is considered most
unlikely that these varied plant types will yield the same drug extracts.
Id. at 1161.
308. Id.

1996]

FALSE INVENTIVE GENUS

211

chert court held that the applicants had failed to adequately
support the generic invention, and thus affirmed the PTO’s
rejection.309
Similarly, in In re Vaeck,310 the Federal Circuit employed
the same reasoning to affirm a section 112 rejection of broad
genus claims.311 In Vaeck, the applicants claimed the use of
specified genetic engineering techniques to produce insecticidal proteins.312 Specifically, the applicants had shown how
to make insecticidal Bacillus proteins with greater killing potential under normal conditions of use, by transfecting a particular cyanobacterium to express the proteins.313 The applicants interposed claims for a chimeric gene capable of being
expressed in Cyanobacteria cells.314 The examiner rejected
the claims, stating that: (1) cyanobacteria comprise a large
and diverse group of photosynthetic bacteria, including
large numbers of species in some 150 different genera, and
(2) that the claims were directed to subject matter having a
high degree of unpredictability, due to the fact that such organisms had only recently come under serious study.315 The
Vaeck court especially noted that the applicants had included
only one example of a successfully transfected cyanobacterium, and that only nine genera of cyanobacteria were mentioned in the specification.316 Because there was a great deal
309. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161.
310. 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
311. Id. at 495-96
312. Id. at 489-90.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 490.
315. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 492-93.
316. The Vaeck court affirmed the section 112 rejection, saying:
[T]here must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology, to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and
how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. This means that
the disclosure must adequately guide the art worker to determine without undue experimentation, which species among all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility. Where as
here a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of disclosure will be
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of uncertainty and unpredictability within the discipline,
and because the applicants had provided such limited supporting disclosure, the Vaeck court affirmed the PTO’s
enablement rejection.317
In In re Wright,318 the applicant disclosed processes for
producing a live, non-pathogenic vaccine against a pathogenic RNA virus.319 The specification possessed a single
working example, describing a recombinant vaccine conferring immunity in chickens against the RNA virus, Prague
Avian Sarcoma Virus (“PrASV”).320 The applicant claimed:
(1) processes for producing live non-pathogenic vaccines, (2)
vaccines produced by those processes, and (3) methods of
using claimed vaccines to protect living organisms against
RNA viruses, generally, avian RNA viruses, and PrASV.321
The PTO rejected Wright’s claims of broad and intermediate scope as non-enabled, given the breadth of the claims,
the unpredictability in the relevant art, and the limited guidance provided by the specification.322 The examiner noted
that Wright’s broad and intermediate claims were directed
to vaccines and methods useful against pathogenic RNA viruses, generally, which included AIDS, leukemia, and sarcoma.323 The examiner reasoned that such broad claims
were not enabled by the disclosure, and that undue experimentation would be required to exploit the invention
greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a
“predictable” factor such as a mechanical or electrical element.
Id. at 496.
317. Id. at 495-96.
318. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
319. Id. at 1559.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1559-60.
322. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560. Wright’s disclosure contained only a single
working example—that is, conferring immunity in chickens against Prague
Avian Sarcoma Virus. Id. Following submission of in vivo data supporting the
efficacy of that example, the corresponding claim was allowed. Id. Rejections
were maintained for the broader claims encompassing non-pathogenic vaccines
for avian RNA viruses and for all RNA viruses. Id.
323. Id. at 1560.
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throughout its scope, particularly in view of the prevailing
unpredictability within the relevant art.324
In response, Wright argued—without supporting data—
that the art was not as unpredictable as the examiner concluded, and that undue experimentation would not have
been required to exploit the invention with other RNA viruses.325 On appeal, the examiner stated that the art had not
even then progressed to the stage the applicant urged as
prevailing at the time of the invention, and specifically noted
that the scientific community had yet to develop an effective
AIDS vaccine.326 For support, the examiner cited for the first
time an intervening reference teaching that AIDS retroviruses, a subset of all RNA viruses, possessed great genetic
diversity.327 The examiner thus argued that the design and
324. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560. The examiner had previously reasoned thus:
With respect to the claims broadly drawn to the claims of vaccines to
any RNA tumor virus via recombinant techniques, it is noted that the
specification does not generically teach the identification and cloning of
all antigenic and pathogenic genes of all possible RNA tumor viruses,
nor does the specification adequately provide means by which the antigenic genes can readily be isolated and cloned into a non-pathogenic virus absent an undue amount of further experimentation.
It has not been shown e.g. that envelope genes are so similar in
structure in different RNA tumor viruses such that the possession and
cloning of the instant env gene would facilitate isolation and cloning of
all others. . . . Note that the virus would have to be expressed on the
surface of the virus so as to present the envelope protein to the host’s
immune system, therefore the gene would have to recombine at a point
that makes the envelope protein get externalized. This is a further issue
of unpredictability.
U.S. Patent Application 06/914,620, Paper No. 3 (July 1, 1988) (This application is
a continuation application of U.S. Patent Application 06/469,985 filed Feb. 25,
1983).
325. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562-63.
326. U.S. Patent Application 06/914,620, Paper No. 27, (“Examiner’s Answer”). The Examiner’s Answer is filed in the latter stages of the prosecution of
a patent application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (1996). It is the examiner’s responsive arguments to Appellant’s Brief on Appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Id. Appellant may make an Appeal and file such a Brief only after
the claim(s) have been twice rejected or for which the rejection has been made
final. Id.
327. Thomas J. Matthews et al., Prospects for Development of a Vaccine Against
HIV, in HUMAN RETROVIRUSES, CANCER, AND AIDS: APPROACHES TO PREVENTION &
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production of recombinant virus vaccines against RNA tumor viruses, generally, and against avian RNA viruses
would have necessitated undue experimentation.328 The examiner’s reasoning was expressly adopted by the PTO Board
of Appeals,329 and was later affirmed by the Federal Circuit.330 Thus, Wright is another illustration of an applicant’s
failure to support generic claims with limited examples.
3. The Burden of Proof Revisited
Wright has been criticized as inconsistent with precedent,
and as undermining the general objectives of the patent system.331 The holding in Wright resulted, in substantial part,
from a shift in the burden of proof, which in turn resulted
THERAPY, 313-25 (1988). Wright’s effective filing date was 1981.
328. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.
329. Id. at 1561 n.5.
330. Id. at 1564.
331. See generally Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1994) (arguing that the court’s approval
of the examiner’s reliance on the intervening (post filing date) reference was contrary to the rule of In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and that the holding
unduly restricts the scope of enablement for biotechnology inventions); cf.
Schuman, supra note 9, at 1699-1700. Schuman argues that the C.C.P.A. especially scrutinizes enablement in the unpredictable arts, particularly those involving microbiological inventions, and thus unduly limits the scope of protection for
inventions in those disciplines. Id.
Schuman proffers a continuum analogy to explain the court’s enablement
holdings in the unpredictable arts as embodied in various holdings from In re
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970) and culminating in Ex parte Jackson, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1982). Id. While the analogy may be
appropriate, Jackson, like Wright and even Fisher itself, illustrates those cases
wherein applicant relied upon a false inventive genus.
In Jackson, applicants presented claims to a process for producing a specified
antibiotic by culturing microorganisms of a specified genus. 217 U.S.P.Q. at 808.
Three strains within the genus were exemplified. Id. As in In re Vaeck, the
C.C.P.A. observed that biological classification was inexact and arbitrary. See
supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing the Vaeck decision). What the
court failed to say, but implicit in its holding, was that the selection of morphological features upon which that classification is based are arbitrary or at the very
least superficial. That is, it would not have been expected by one of skill in the
art that the features upon which the microorganisms were taxonomically classified were necessarily consistent with the production of an antibiotic. Thus, reliance on the taxonomic genus was unrelated to the inventive feature, and the
claims failed due to reliance on a false inventive genus.
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the PTO’s assessment that the discipline was unpredictable.
In re Wright is significant in that it further refined the relationship between unpredictability and the burden of proof in
supporting or rejecting generic claims.
The burden is on the PTO to make a prima facie case that
the scope of a generic claim is not commensurate with the
scope of enablement provided by the disclosure. This is especially so where the PTO takes exception to the applicant’s
explicit representations supporting the breadth of the
claims.332 That is, the PTO must affirmatively rebut the applicant’s implicit assertion that one of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would appreciate the practicability of the invention, or would be able to confirm it without inventive experimentation.333
The PTO often seeks to meet this burden by arguing that
the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the invention and

332. See, e.g., In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 862 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Marzocchi,
439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Ex parte Gastambide, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643,
645 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1974).
333. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561-62. As the Wright court explained:
When rejecting a claim under the enablement requirement of section
112, the PTO bears an initial burden of setting forth a reasonable explanation as to why it believes that the scope of protection provided by
that claim is not adequately enabled by the description of the invention
provided in the specification of the application; this includes, of course,
providing sufficient reasons for doubting any assertions in the specification as to the scope of enablement. If the PTO meets this burden, the
burden then shifts to the applicant to provide suitable proofs indicating
that the specification is indeed enabling.
Id.; see also Ex parte Gastambide, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1974) (holding proper grounds for rejection require more than unsubstantiated
doubt as to the operability of the invention); cf. In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452, 457
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (concluding that section 112 does not require that the specification convince persons skilled in the art that assertions therein are correct). But cf.
Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992)
(“When a patent applicant chooses to forego exemplification and bases utility on
broad terminology and general allegations, he runs the risk that unless one with
ordinary skill in the art would accept the allegations as obviously valid and correct, the examiner may, properly, ask for evidence to substantiate them.”) (citations omitted).
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the genus are coextensive.334 Support for that argument can
be drawn from teachings in the prior art, as in In re Fouche,335
or, as we learn from Wright, from a general assessment that
the relevant art is unpredictable.336
Just as the sufficiency of an applicant’s disclosure must
be measured as of its filing date,337 so too must support for
the PTO’s rejection rely upon the prevailing state of the art
as of the filing date.338 In In re Hogan,339 the court struck
down a rejection based upon a later development in the
relevant art.340 In Hogan, the applicants disclosed and
claimed solid polymers made from certain olefinic monomers.341 Subsequent to the applicants’ priority date, a publication appeared disclosing that certain polymers within the
claimed genus could be synthesized in an amorphous, rather
than crystalline, form.342 The examiner rejected the genus
claim as not enabled, noting that while the applicants’ disclosed embodiments were crystalline, the patent claims were
not so limited.343 The revelation of a crystalline/amorphous
dichotomy, the examiner reasoned, rendered the claims ambiguous, and therefore unduly broad and non-enabled.344
The appellate court held that there was no basis on the
record to question the sufficiency of the applicants’ disclosure as of their filing date, absent the later publication; that
is, as of the filing date, there was no reason to suspect the

334. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d
1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
335. See supra notes 228-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Fouche
decision).
336. See generally In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
337. See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
338. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
339. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 597-98.
342. Id. at 599-600.
343. Id. at 600.
344. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 600.
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polymers would be other than crystalline.345 Thus, the examiner improperly relied upon the later publication to challenge the sufficiency of the disclosure.346
In Wright, the applicant disclosed methods for making
vaccines against RNA viruses, vaccines produced thereby,
and methods for protecting living organisms against RNA
viruses.347 While providing only a single example, the applicant interposed claims directed to the exemplified virus,
PrASV, as well as all avian RNA viruses, and RNA viruses,
generally.348 The examiner rejected the claims of the latter
two categories for lack of enablement, and, on appeal to the
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, cited an intervening reference.349 The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection, and, on further appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the Wright court affirmed the PTO’s rejections of the claims
in the latter two categories for lack of enablement.350
One commentator has argued that, at the very least,
Wright’s claims of intermediate scope, directed to vaccines
against avian RNA viruses, should have been allowed, and
that the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the intervening article
contravened Hogan.351
In re Wright does not contravene Hogan. Rather, it
stands for the proposition that the PTO need not rely on an
explicit teaching or admission to assess unpredictability, and
that assessment alone might be sufficient to shift the burden
of proof. Wright thus charts a middle path between the principles espoused in Hogan and those of In re Fouche.
In Hogan, the court refused to allow the PTO to use an in345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 605.
Id.
Wright, 999 F.2d at 1559-60.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1564.
Canady, supra note 331, at 258-62.
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tervening reference to find unpredictability in the first instance.352 The first indication that the applicants had not enabled the creation of olefinic polymers as broadly as had
been claimed came from the reference published after the
applicants’ priority date.353 Thus, the post-priority reference
was essential to the examiner’s prima facie case.354
In Wright, the court specifically held that the PTO had
met its burden by setting forth a reasonable basis for doubting the applicant’s broad, unsupported statements, and thus
the sufficiency of the disclosure.355 That reasoning created a
prima facie case, and shifted the burden to Wright to prove
otherwise.356 The examiner’s reliance on the intervening article, according to the court, merely countered the applicant’s rebuttal by demonstrating that the relevant art was
not even then as predictable as the applicant suggested it
was at the time the application was filed.357 The Wright
court thus concluded that the intervening article was not
needed to make a prima facie case of non-enablement.358 The
applicants failure to respond with “persuasive arguments,
supported by suitable proofs where necessary, that the appealed claims were truly enabled” resulted in the demise of
the broader claims.359
352. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605-06.
353. Id. at 605 & n.17.
354. Id.
355. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also id. at 1564 (addressing specifically the
more narrow claims directed to avian RNA viruses); cf. Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991) (noting that in the absence of examples or support for the proposition that one of skill would accept
representations as obviously valid and correct, the PTO might properly ask for
evidence to substantiate them).
356. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562.
357. Id. at 1562-63.
358. Id. In Wright, the court held that the PTO’s assessment of unpredictability merely shifted the burden to Wright to provide evidence supporting the
propriety of his inventive genus. Id. This he failed to do. Notwithstanding, one
can’t help but wonder whether the result in Wright would have been different
had the art turned out to be as predictable as Wright alleged in his disclosure.
See id. at 1562.
359. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562.
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III. ADOPTION OF A NEW APPROACH—THE FALSE INVENTIVE
GENUS—WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE CONSISTENT
APPLICATION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE INQUIRY
When working within disciplines perceived to be unpredictable, the applicant is at risk of assuming the burden of
proof that a generic claim is, in fact, supported by his or her
disclosure.360 That risk is increased when the PTO or the
courts conclude that the applicant or the patentee has relied
on a false inventive genus. This part introduces the notion
of the false inventive genus, and examines its role in the sufficiency of the disclosure analysis among the unpredictable
arts.
A. The False Inventive Genus Defined
With the demise of rejections based upon undue
breadth361 and inoperative embodiments,362 and the ascent of
the undue experimentation inquiry,363 there remains a nagging ambiguity. Rejections alleging the need for undue experimentation, or that the scope of enablement is not commensurate in scope with the claims, beg the question.364
Standing alone, they offer the applicant little more than a
bald rebuke that he or she either did not disclose enough, or
seeks to claim too much.

360. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing generally the
burden of proof generally in the context of the unpredictable arts); supra notes
187-236 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in the context of
“inoperative embodiments”); supra notes 331-58 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in the context of “undue experimentation”).
361. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text (discussing rejections
based on “undue breadth”).
362. See supra 117-236 and accompanying text (discussing rejections based
on “inoperative embodiments”).
363. See supra 237-359 and accompanying text (discussing rejections based
on “undue experimentation”).
364. See Todaro, supra, note 7, at 39 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s
course away from reliance on the Forman factors for determining undue experimentation will erode predictability in the law and leave applicants guessing as to
what constitutes undue experimentation).
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In some instances, the implicit supporting argument is
that the applicant has indulged in an impermissible generalization or has created a false inventive genus; that is, the
feature or principle upon which the applicant relies to generalize the invention beyond the empirical results presented
is collateral to the invention. Although not expressed as
such, the objection has arisen persistently within the unpredictable arts.365
By identifying the creation of a false inventive genus, the
PTO and the courts will more readily isolate the unsupported inference or extrapolation giving rise to the alleged
insufficiency in the disclosure. In so doing, reviewing authorities will more reliably focus on the issues requiring
resolution, address those issues, and thereby bring greater
consistency and predictability to this area of the law.
The issues derived from reliance on a false inventive genus have arisen periodically in various contexts since at least
the advent of the undue experimentation inquiry.366 Moreover, some of the decisions discussed above address rejections founded upon an applicant’s creation and reliance on a
false inventive genus.
For example, in In re Sichert, the applicants included
wide-ranging families of plants as source material for a
drug.367 The court concluded that the applicants had generalized the invention based upon taxonomic criteria not necessarily related to drug content.368 The court affirmed the
365. See, e.g., In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557; see also supra notes 237-359
and accompanying text (discussing these decisions).
366. See, e.g., PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 124; see also In re
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557; In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488; In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154; see
also supra notes 237-359 and accompanying text (discussing the undue experimentation inquiry).
367. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1156; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the Sichert decision).
368. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1162-63; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the Sichert decision).
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PTO Board of Appeals’ conclusion that it was “most unlikely” that plant extracts from the various plant families in
Sichert’s generic claim possessed the desired drug.369 Thus,
Sichert had created a false inventive genus, and the court affirmed the PTO’s enablement rejection of the generic
claim.370
Similarly, the applicant in In re Vaeck relied on a false inventive genus. In Vaeck, the applicant claimed techniques
for genetically manipulating cyanobacteria, generally, to
produce insecticidal Bacillus proteins.371 As in Sichert, the
applicant in Vaeck sought to define the scope of his exclusive
right by relying upon traditional taxonomic classification.372
In rejecting the applicant’s claim, the Vaeck court concluded
that the principles upon which this taxonomic system is
based are not necessarily coincident with suitability for the
disclosed genetic manipulation.373 That is, the applicant had
not shown that there was a nexus between the taxonomic basis upon which cyanobacteria is classified, and the ability of
the cyanobacteria to incorporate foreign DNA molecules to
express the requisite insecticidal protein.374 Thus, the court
held that one of skill in the relevant art would not conclude,
based upon mere commonality of gross morphological features, that these varied microorganisms could be trans369. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the Sichert decision).
370. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the Sichert decision).
371. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489-90; see also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the
Vaeck decision).
372. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489-90; see also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the
Vaeck decision).
373. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see
also supra notes 310-16(discussing the Vaeck decision).
374. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see
also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the Vaeck decision).
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formed with the same chimeric gene to express insecticidal
Bacillus proteins.375
Similarly, the Wright court’s reasoning suggests that the
applicant’s disclosure failed to establish an acknowledged
and relevant relationship between the sole exemplified recombinant PrASV, and avian retroviruses and retroviruses,
generally.376 Wright failed to persuade the PTO and the
court that one of skill in the relevant art would accept as obviously valid and correct that all avian retroviruses possess
the feature he had genetically manipulated in PrASV, or
were susceptible to such manipulation, to create a recombinant virus capable of effecting an immunoprotective, rather
than pathogenic, response.377 Seemingly, Wright had arbitrarily chosen to genericize the invention based upon morphological features of a host, rather than demonstrably recurrent genetic features of the virus, per se.378 This reliance
on an ad hoc genus, coupled with a lack of supporting evidence, precipitated the downfall of the claims.379
Some cases involved in the inoperative embodiments imbroglio fit the same model. A few examples from the discussion above are illustrative.380 In Fisher, for example, the
court found fatal flaws in claims directed to an adrenocorticotrophic hormone (“ACTH”) preparation.381 The appli375. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see
also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the Vaeck decision).
376. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the Wright decision).
377. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the Wright decision).
378. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1564; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the Wright decision).
379. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1564; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the Wright decision).
380. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing rejections
based on inoperative embodiments generally).
381. 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Fisher decision).
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cant’s specification disclosed the ACTH amino acid sequences for hog, sheep, and beef: all were thirty-nine amino
acids in length, the first twenty-four of which were identical.382 The applicant claimed ACTHs having at least these
common twenty-four amino acids in sequence, thus relying
on the common sequence to genericize the invention.383
Nonetheless, the applicant failed to show availability or activity of ACTHs of anything other than thirty-nine amino acids, much less those of only twenty-four amino acids.384 Although the applicant identified a generic feature among his
enabled embodiments (i.e., a particular twenty-four amino
acid sequence), he improperly relied upon that feature to
genericize the invention because it lacked a nexus with the
activity relied upon for utility.385 Accordingly, the Fischer
court affirmed the rejection of the broad claims.386
Similarly, in In re Barr,387 the issue on appeal involved
claims to certain photographic “coupler” compounds, and, in
particular, the applicants’ generic terminology in claiming
those compounds.388 The examiner objected to the use of the
terms, “5-pyrazolone coupler radical” and “open-chain ketomethylene coupler radical,” because only a few of such
radicals were exemplified in the specification.389 The Barr
court faulted the examiner and the PTO Board of Appeals,
382. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fisher decision).
383. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 835; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fisher decision).
384. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fisher decision).
385. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 838-39; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fisher decision).
386. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 840; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fisher decision).
387. 444 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompanying text (discussing the Barr decision).
388. Barr, 444 F.2d at 595; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompanying text (discussing the Barr decision).
389. Barr, 444 F.2d at 595; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompanying text (discussing the Barr decision).
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noting that the appellants had contemplated the utility of the
genus within their specification, but that neither the examiner nor the board had explained why that genus was suspect.390 The PTO had failed to present reasoning or evidence
questioning the appellants’ use of terminology by which
they defined their invention.391 Absent such reasoning or
evidence, the PTO was obligated to accept it.392 Thus, the
examiner’s implicit argument—that these terms represented
a false inventive genus—failed.
Finally, in Marzocchi, the examiner had objected to the
appellants’ use of the generic term “polyethyleneamine” in
defining a class of adhesion enhancers in their invention.393
The appellants had used the term consistently within the
disclosure to describe the invention, and in the claims to define the scope of the invention.394 Because the PTO failed to
explain why it doubted the truth or accuracy of the appellants’ supporting statements, it was obligated to accept them
as true.395 Again, what was effectively a false inventive genus argument failed.
B. Routine Experimentation or False Inventive Genus
An applicant is not obligated to provide examples of all
conceivable embodiments of the claimed invention.396
Nonetheless, while a specification need not be a blueprint,397
an applicant is not entitled to usurp broad areas of technol-

390. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693 (C.C.P.A.
1979); In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
391. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompanying text (discussing the Barr decision).
392. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompanying text (discussing the Barr decision).
393. 439 F.2d at 221-22; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
394. 439 F.2d at 223; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
395. 439 F.2d at 223; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 204-05, 208-09 and accompanying text.
397. See generally Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 181
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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ogy by making broad, unsupported statements.398
The sufficiency of disclosure challenges most commonly
arise where the applicant expressly contemplates broad applicability of the innovation based upon a discovery that
purportedly brings predictability to a discipline,399 but
where the applicant arguably has not supported that newfound predictability with sufficient reliable scientific
proof.400 In such cases, the applicant has complied with the
written description requirement,401 and perhaps has made a
prima facie case for enablement.402 Nonetheless, if the PTO
can show that the field of endeavor is notoriously unpredictable, the absence of examples or data that thoroughly correspond to the scope of the claim might operate to shift the
burden back to applicant to further prove enablement.403
The challenge often arises from one of two perspectives—either the applicant: (1) has failed to provide a disclosure that enables one of skill in the art to practice the invention throughout its scope, or (2) has failed to provide a
disclosure that would lead one of skill in the art to conclude
that the utility of the claimed invention resides throughout
the claimed genus.404 Although the subtleties of the two per398. See In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357, 361 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“The mere statement of an inventive concept, however, is not a sufficient basis for claiming it.
Sufficient information must be given to enable those skilled in the art to practice
the invention.”); see also supra note 301 (discussing the Cavallito decision); supra
notes 38-40, 54, 68 and accompanying text (explaining that full disclosure of inventors’ claims protects the public against ad hoc extension of exclusive rights).
399. See supra notes 68-73 (discussing disclosure in the unpredictable arts).
400. See supra notes 68-73 (discussing disclosure in the unpredictable arts).
401. See supra notes 44-46 (explaining the statutory requirement of a written
description); notes 132-47 (written description in the context of the unpredictable
arts).
402. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing enablement
generally); notes 150-76 and accompanying text (discussing enablement in the
unpredictable arts).
403. See supra notes 187-236 and accompanying text (discussing the burden
of proof in the context of “inoperative embodiments” rejections); notes 331-58
and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in the context of “undue
experimentation” inquiry).
404. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text
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spectives might differ, the essential inquiry is the same:
whether the applicant provided a disclosure sufficiently
thorough that one of skill in the relevant art would expect
that he or she would be enabled to successfully exploit the
invention throughout the claimed scope. If the applicant has
arbitrarily chosen features assumed to be generic to the invention, one might conclude that one of skill in the art
would not expect to be able to successfully exploit the invention throughout that genus.
The decision to grant or uphold broad generic claims in
any art involves a series of subtle, qualitative inquiries in
view of the prior art as a whole. For example, the PTO can
be expected to consider, from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, whether working embodiments
of the invention would be expected to reside throughout the
claimed range.405 Moreover, the issue might arise as to
whether further experimentation would be required so as to
exploit the invention in its entirety; if so, would one expect it
to be merely routine (albeit perhaps lengthy) experimentation—which will not defeat the claim406—or would one ex405. See supra notes 117-236 and accompanying text (discussing rejections
based on “inoperative embodiments”).
406. See supra notes 237-359 (discussing rejections based on “undue experimentation”); see, e.g., Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916); In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498; In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220; In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730; International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor
Co. 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Ex parte Mark, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989). In International Nickel Co., the court, quoting Judge
Learned Hand, reiterated:
It is as if a chemist were directed to add enough of an element to secure
precipitation. Such a recipe would be an absolutely accurate guide to
the result though the quantity varied with the temperature or atmospheric humidity. What men need is a path to the goal; they will not be
curious of the country it traverses.
166 F. Supp. at 558 (quoting Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co.,
232 F. 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1916)). Similarly, in Mark, the court explained:
The fact that a given protein may not be amenable for use in the present
invention in that the cysteine residues are needed for the biological activity of the protein does not militate against a conclusion of enablement. One skilled in the art is clearly enabled to perform such work as
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pect it to require ingenuity beyond that attributable to one of
ordinary skill in the art—which might defeat the claim.407
Occasionally, these determinations, and the larger question
of allowability (or validity), will depend upon whether the
invention is properly denominated “unpredictable.” As has
been stated so many times, however, there can be no general
rule, and the scope of protection properly afforded depends
upon the facts of each individual case.
CONCLUSION
Inventions within the unpredictable arts present unique
challenges in meeting the Patent Act’s disclosure requirements. Applications claiming an invention possessed of unpredictable factors will be carefully scrutinized for compliance with the utility, written description, how-to-make-anduse, and enablement requirements. Even if the applicant’s
disclosure facially complies with those requirements, courts
or the PTO might still challenge the applicant for evidence to
support enablement.
The PTO bears the burden of supporting that challenge
with acceptable evidence or reasoning why it doubts the
truth or accuracy of supporting statements within the disclosure. When the invention is claimed more broadly than that
which is exemplified within the application, unpredictability
alone might satisfy that burden. If so, the burden shifts to
the applicant to prove enablement throughout the scope of
needed to determine whether the cysteine residues of a given protein
are needed for retention of biological activity.
12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1907.
407. See supra notes 237-359 (discussing rejections based on “undue experimentation”); see, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159
U.S. 465, 16 S. Ct. 75 (1895); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Panzl v. Battle Island Paper Co., 138 F. 48
(2d Cir. 1905); In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Schmidt, 153
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Grant, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 248
(C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Cavallito, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (C.C.P.A. 1960); Ex parte
Singh, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990); Ex parte Sizto, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2081 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988).
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the claim; to meet that burden, the applicant should be entitled to draw upon evidence that is extrinsic to the application itself.
When generically claiming an invention likely to be denominated unpredictable, applicants should strive to establish an explicit logical link, through carefully constructed
evidence or reasoning, connecting the demonstrated operability of the invention with the basis upon which the genus
has been selected. Failure to do so leaves an applicant open
to a sufficiency of disclosure rejection, due to apparent reliance on a false inventive genus. By expressly identifying instances of improper reliance on a false inventive genus, the
PTO will focus more effectively on the perceived shortcoming, thereby narrowing any outstanding issues and enhancing the prospects for proper and well-reasoned resolution of
those issues.

